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INTRODUCTION

A search of private premises by law enforcement authorities who
lack a valid warrant issued upon probable cause is generally deemed to
be per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment. In certain situations, however, where particular exigent circumstances exist or where
valid consent to search is given, courts have sought to carve out special
exceptions to the warrant requirement. An examination of the cases
dealing with consent searches reveals that two basic problematic areas
have evolved in the course of adjudicating their validity. The first
major issue, present in all such searches, is the voluntariness of the
consent or permission itself. The second problem arises when a party
other than the accused permits a search, and therefore surrenders the
rights of the defendant. Despite the difficulties that these searches present, however, until recently the Supreme Court of the United States
had been able to decide several consent cases without generating the inconsistency and confusion that have resulted from its decisions in other
areas of search and seizure law.1 The Court's ability to avoid these
difficulties is attributable less to the vigor of its analysis than to its
failure to attempt a thorough exploration of the issues. Last term, however, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,2 the Court finally analyzed in
depth the question of voluntariness, and this term, in United States v.
Matlock,3 the Court reaffirmed its prior implicit acceptance of third
4
party consents to search.
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1 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473-84 (1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-62 (1969), wherein the Court stated: "The decisions of this
Court bearing upon [a search incident to an arrest] have been far from consistent ....
Id. at 755. Compare United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580-83 (1971), with Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418-20 (1969). See generally Miles & Wefing, The Automobile
Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled Relationship, 4 SrroN HATL L. REv. 10%,
112-32 (1972).
2 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
3 42 U.S.L..W. 4252 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1974).
4 See pp. 256-61 infra.
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Bustamonte is a strained, self-contradictory opinion which not
only represents a drastic departure from the Court's own previous
cases, but also undermines a substantial body of prior federal case law
which reflected a sustained and sometimes creative effort to develop a
coherent consent-search doctrine. 5 In effect, this case eliminated the
"waiver" requirement,6 a concept which has emerged as a critical factor
in Supreme Court decisions and which has been heavily relied upon
by the lower federal courts. Rather, it adopted the "totality of the
circumstances" test which was employed primarily by the California
state courts7 and which consisted of a more relaxed voluntariness standard than that employed by the federal courts. Further, the Bustamonte
Court equated the "voluntariness" of consent obtained for a search in
a non-custodial setting with the "voluntariness" of a confession elicited
as the result of police interrogation. s In so doing, it applied to the
fourth amendment consent issue a line of confession cases involving
the problem of voluntariness which had been rendered obsolete by
Miranda v. Arizona,9 and arrived at the conclusion that a person could
voluntarily waive fourth amendment rights even without knowledge
that they existed.' 0
In Matlock, the Supreme Court for the first time specifically addressed itself to the issue of third party consents. Although the Court
did not fully discuss the underlying constitutional problems implicit
in this area, the prior underdeveloped assumption that third party consents were valid was upheld.1 ' This decision conformed with a large
body of lower court opinion which had held that a person with equal
or superior right of possession and control over premises or effects
2
could consent to the search of such property.'
5 See, e.g., Rosenthall v. Henderson, 389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968); Gorman v. United
States, 380 F.2d 158 (Ist Cir. 1967); Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826 (1966).
6 412 U.S. at 246. The Court used the term "waiver" in its first consent case, Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921). It also employed "waiver" language in later consent cases such as Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964), and Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). Subsequent to Amos, lower federal courts have also described
consents as waivers. See, e.g., Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826 (1966); United States v. Kelih, 272 F. 484, 490-91 (S.D. Ill. 1921).
7 412 U.S. at 227.
8 Id. at 223-27.
9 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10 412 U.S. at 249.
11 42 U.S.L.W. at 4256.
12 See pp. 254-55 infra. The Matlock Court added to the doctrine of possession and
control criteria of valid third party consent the unexplained concept that a person may
consent who had "other sufficient relationship to the premises or effect sought to be
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The Court's resolution of the consent search issues raised in
Bustamonte and Matlock undoubtedly had its genesis in the same factors which have, with increasing frequency, proved to be problematic
in other search and seizure areas. There was little fourth amendment
case law prior to the twentieth century, and fourth amendment concepts inherited from the eighteenth century and applied in the nineteenth century were broad and simplistic.' 3 However, the increased emphasis on law enforcement in the twentieth century, 14 along with the
Court's effort to deter police aggressiveness by means of an absolute
exclusionary rule,'15 necessitated the development of well-defined search
inspected." 42 U.S.L.W. at 4254 (footnote omitted). It is questionable whether this concept adds anything to the possession and control doctrine or whether it only serves
to further confuse an already amorphous concept.
13 The major nineteenth century decision on search and seizure, Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), referred to few federal cases as precedent on fourth amendment law. Further, the commentaries on constitutional law which were relied upon
discussed the fourth amendment in brief and general terms. The Court viewed the
fourth and fifth amendments as all but merging on search and seizure issues where
rights of privacy are impinged upon. Id. at 633. This is not to say that fourth amendment
rights were lightly regarded. Id. at 625-29.
For typical examples of the fourth amendment principles espoused in early cases,
see Stockwell v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 116, 121-23 (No. 13,466) (C.C.D. Me. 1870),
aff'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871); Stanwood v. Green, 22 F. Gas. 1077, 1079 (No. 13,301)
(S.D. Miss. 1870); Ex parte Field, 9 F. Cas. 1, 3 (No. 4,761) (C.C.D. Vt. 1862). However,
state courts during this period had greater occasion to deal with the kind of search
and seizure issues which are frequently raised today. See, e.g., Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn.
40 (1814); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841); Sandford v. Nichols, 13
Mass. 232, 13 Tyng 286 (1816); Bell v. Clapp, 6 Am. Dec. 339, 10 Johns. 263 (N.Y. 1813).
14 During the twentieth century, the federal government greatly expanded the
scope of its law enforcement activities. Previously, beginning with the period immediately
after the adoption of the Constitution, the wellspring of federal power to partake in law
enforcement was the "necessary and proper" clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See A. MILLSPAUGH, CRIME CONTROL By THE NATIONAL GOvERNMENT 45 (1937). Thus, federal activity
was restricted to the protection of its own operations which were enumerated in the
Constitution-i.e., the collection of taxes, operation of the postal system, and the enforcement of federal statutes. As a result, state and local governments were left to carry out
the bulk of police and crime prevention functions.
More recently, the broad construction given to the "commerce clause," U.S. CoNsr. art.
I, § 8, permitting federal regulation of many new areas, has generated the need for a
greater federal law enforcement capability. See A. MILLSPAUGH, supra at 50-51. Examples of
statutes which resulted from the need for deeper federal involvement with interstate
criminal activity include: Fugitive Felon Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1071 et seq. (1970); Lindbergh Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-02 (1970); Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970); Motor
Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-13 (1970); Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 et seq. (1970).
Furthermore, during the 1930's Congress provided for greater cooperation between the
states by giving advance consent to those compacts or agreements which pertained to the
prevention of crime. Previously, pursuant to U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, each such agreement
required separate congressional consent.
15 In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court fashioned a constitutional
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and seizure guidelines. Sweeping language which had seemed adequate
for nineteenth century problems only led to confusion when applied to
the considerable variety of factual situations encountered in modern
searches and seizures. 18
Above all, the Court's difficulties in Bustamonte and Matlock exemplify the seemingly insuperable obstacles the Court faces in its efforts
to accommodate the fourth amendment exclusionary rule with the
problems faced by the state law enforcement officers in their day-to-day
confrontations with criminal suspects. The application by the Court of
the exclusionary rule to the states, by incorporation through the fourteenth amendment, 17 made this effort necessary. The complexities of
this application had been noted by Justice Harlan:
[O]ne is now faced with the dilemma . . . of choosing between
vindicating sound Fourth Amendment principles at the possible
expense of state concerns, long recognized to be consonant with the
Fourteenth Amendment before Mapp and Ker came on the books,
or diluting the Federal Bill of Rights in the interest of leaving the
States at least some elbow room in their methods of criminal law
enforcement.' 8
In Bustamonte, the Court chose to provide the states with some flexibility in the area of consent searches by sacrificing a substantial body
of carefully developed federal case law. 19 In reversing a Ninth Circuit
decision" it adopted, instead, a California state-court standard with
21
some conceptual embellishments.
rule which enabled a criminal defendant in a pre-trial proceeding to prohibit the fruits
of illegal searches and seizures which had been conducted by federal officers from being
admitted into evidence at trial. See id. at 398.
16 See, e.g., Chime] v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-62 (1969), in which Justice Stewart
described the confusion and contradictions generated by the Court's earlier cases concerning searches incident to arrest.
17 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-31
(1963). The exclusionary rule was originally developed to ensure the federal government's
compliance with fourth amendment standards. See note 15 supra.
18 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 769 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
19 See 412 U.S. at 223, 227. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
20 Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1971).
21 See 412 U.S. at 248-49. The primary California case relied upon by the Court
was People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 753, 290 P.2d 852, 854 (1955), which held that
[w]hether in a particular case an apparent consent was in fact voluntarily given
or was in submission to an express or implied assertion of authority, is a question of fact to be determined in the light of all the circumstances.
Id. at 753, 290 P.2d at 854. For a cogent criticism of this and similar California cases see
Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements:
A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure,1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78, 115-19.
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It is likely that Bustamonte will increase the difficulties faced by
state and lower federal courts in resolving questions concerning voluntariness in consent searches. Additionally, the difficulties inherent in
third party consent issues will remain, despite the decision in Matlock,
because of the difficulties in applying the possession and control doctrine. 22 This article will examine both the voluntariness and third
party consent issues and the vexing problems courts have faced in their
interpretation and application. It will conclude with suggestions as to
how each issue might be resolved without sacrificing either constitutional protections or legitimate law enforcement interests.
NATURE

OF

CONSENT

A court attempting to determine the validity of a consent search
is forced to deal with an inherently evasive concept. It need not decide
whether the fourth amendment applies or whether its requirements
have been satisfied. Rather, the issue to be determined is whether the
protections of the fourth amendment have, in fact, been waived by a
party with authority or standing to do so. The answer to this problem
is not to be found in the language of the fourth amendment itself.
The ultimate issue is not whether the police have acted reasonably. At
best, the legality of the officer's conduct can rest only in part on the
manner in which he requests consent. If the officer acts reasonably in
this respect, the validity of the search will then depend upon whether
the individual nominally giving permission did so voluntarily. Thus,
the question becomes whether the consenting party did in fact permit
the search. In this respect a consent search differs from any other
fourth amendment case, since its validity depends ultimately upon the
consenting individual's state of mind. All other search and seizure issues are resolved by measuring police conduct against either the amendment's specific requirements-probable cause and the essentials of a
warrant-or against the more general standard of "reasonableness." In
the usual fourth amendment case, state of mind is irrelevant, even
where it must be determined whether an individual's "reasonable ex23
pectation of privacy" has been violated.
22 See pp. 261-78 infra.
23 Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360

(1967), set forth a two-fold requirement "that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy" and that there be an "expectation . . . that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361. However, it would appear that later cases have ignored the "subjective" test and have emphasized the criterion of objective reasonableness
when analyzing the expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
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The legal problems inherent in resolving the validity of a consent
are further aggravated by the factual determination which a court
must make. Consent searches frequently result in courtroom contests
involving conflicting testimony by the party who gave the alleged consent and the officer who purportedly obtained it. Reconstructing exactly what and how things were said may be even more difficult than
determining whose account was the more credible one. The precise
words used by the officer in asking for consent and those used by the
subject in giving it are crucial. Yet, how often can anyone recall precisely what he has said, or what has been said to him? Additionally,
physical influences, such as the tone of one's voice, may be of more
significance than the words spoken. Obviously, the same words may be
used by an officer to convey either full willingness to leave the decision
up to the subject, or to create the impression of official firmness which
leaves the person feeling that there was no choice but to consent. Yet,
tone of voice, inflection, and the physical bearing of the officer are
impossible to reconstruct in the courtroom. The same is true of the
subject's response. The words "go ahead" can convey either defiant
24
willingness based on one's confidence in his innocence or cleverness,
or an expression of a law-abiding citizen's desire to cooperate. Similarly,
they may merely reflect grudging acquiescence to what is perceived as
a command.
Because a valid consent obviates the need for a search warrant,
most cases which have construed the fourth amendment are of little
value in resolving the threshold issue of whether a consent was validly
obtained or voluntarily given. 25 Until Bustamonte the most vexing
751-53 (1971); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968); United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1032
(1969); Kirsch v. State, 10 Md. App. 565, 568-69, 271 A.2d 770, 772 (Ct. Spec. App. 1970).
24 See, e.g., Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1960) (where the defendant's alleged statement, "I have no stuff in my apartment and you are welcome to go
search the whole place" was deemed not to convey consent but merely to evidence false
bravado); United States v. Arrington, 215 F.2d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 1954) (where the defendant,
apparently believing that his wife disposed of incriminating evidence, told postal inspectors:
"Go ahead, look around").
Courts have rarely, if ever, posed the question why a rational individual who knows
that he has the right to refuse would permit a search that he suspects might be incriminating. Courts have raised the issue of whether consent to search can ever be voluntary.
"Intimidation and duress are almost necessarily implicit in such situations." Judd v. United
States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See Comment, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal
After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. Rzv. 130, 131 (1967).
25 See note 69 infra. The voluntariness of consent raises certain questions: First, was
the consenting party pressured into incriminating himself? Second, if his consent was not
the result of his own free choice, have the police violated his due process rights under
either the fifth or fourteenth amendments? Finally, should he be permitted to consult with

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

1974]

problem had concerned the definition and refinement of the elements
necessary to constitute a valid waiver of fourth amendment rights.
CONSENT AND

THE SUPREME COURT

Although the Supreme Court has reviewed the validity of consent
searches in at least seven decisions during the past fifty years, 26 not
until Bustamonte did it attempt to develop comprehensive criteria for
determining voluntariness. Also, despite the Matlock decision, it still
has not adequately explored the complex issues inherent in the area of
third party consent.
An historical analysis of the Supreme Court's approach to consent
searches necessarily begins in 1921 with an examination of Amos v.
United States. 27 In that case, the Court made certain assumptions about

the nature of consent searches which were subsequently developed by
lower federal courts into a fairly coherent doctrine. Later, the Court
appeared to deviate from these assumptions in two war-time cases that
seemingly turned on "implied consent" 28 as well as the nature of the
a lawyer before making such a critical decision? See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § SS 240.2(3)

(Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1972). Although courts have not
generally acknowledged these issues, they have been implicitly presented to the Supreme
Court in recent cases concerning the fifth and sixth amendment rights of suspects questioned by police. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966). It is noteworthy that the Court's first consent case, Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), spoke of both fourth and fifth amendment rights. Id. at 315-16.
26 United States v. Matlock, 42 U.S.L.W. 4252 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1974); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328
U.S. 624 (1946), rev'd mem., 330 U.S. 800 (1947); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
In United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 69-70 (1944), the Court, without discussing the
issue, assumed that a valid consent had occurred. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971), police obtained an incriminating firearm with the cooperation of the suspect's
wife. The Court did not consider this a "police search." Id. at 487. In Bustamonte, however, Justice Stewart, who authored Coolidge, discussed that case as if it had been decided
as a consent case. See 412 U.S. at 234 n.15, 245.
27 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
28 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946),
rev'd mem., 330 U.S. 800 (1947).
The doctrine of "implied consent" has developed in a different context than that of
a "consent search." Implied consent applies to persons who agree to regulatory inspections
by entering a certain business (such as the sale of liquor) or engaging in an activity (such
as driving a motor vehicle) that requires licensing by the government. In return for the
privilege of engaging in the regulated business or activity, the person impliedly consents
to intrusions by those authorized to enforce the regulations and who would otherwise be
forbidden from doing so by the fourth amendment. No actual consent is necessary to
validate an "inspection," which in reality may be a search of a person or premises covered
by the "implied consent" rule. The distinction between consent and implied consent was
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evidence seized. It is possible, nonetheless, to discern in the remaining
pre-Bustamonte opinions a basic, although skeletal, consent search doctrine upon which the lower federal courts and several state courts have
relied.
The Court's brief but instructive treatment of the consent issue
in Amos arose out of a whiskey tax prosecution. Internal Revenue
collectors, acting in the daytime but without a warrant, went to Amos'
home. Not finding him there, they told his wife that they "had come
to search the premises 'for violations of the revenue law.' "29 After
Amos' wife opened the adjacent store, they searched it and found
illicitly distilled whiskey. They proceeded thereafter to search his home
where they found more contraband liquor. Some of the liquor seized
from the defendant's home was admitted into evidence.30 The Court
unanimously held that the admission was unlawful because the search
was "inplain violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States." 31 The government had argued that
Amos' wife had consented to the search and therefore the fruits of that
search should have been admitted. 2 To this the Court retorted:
The contention that the constitutional rights of defendant
were waived when his wife admitted to his home the Government
officers, who came, without warrant, demanding admission to make
search of it under Government authority, cannot be entertained.
We need not consider whether it is possible for a wife, in the absence of her husband, thus to waive his constitutional rights, for
it is perfectly clear that under the implied coercion here presented,
33
no such waiver was intended or effected.
Despite its brevity on the consent issue, Amos was significant in
at least two respects. First, it implied that a valid consent to a search
constituted a waiver of rights, although in deciding the validity of the
wife's alleged consent it did not distinguish between the fourth and
made by Justice White in United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972):
In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the search depends not on
consent but on the authority of a valid statute.
Id. at 315. See also State v. Conners, 125 N.J. Super. 500, 311 A.2d 764 (Monmouth County
Ct. 1973) (driver of motor vehicle held to have given "implied consent" for submission to
breathalyzer test); Harlan v. State, N.H.--, 308 A.2d 856 (1973) (ninety-day suspension of driving privileges of driver who initially refused breathalyzer test but subsequently
changed her mind based on "implied consent').
29 255 U.S. at 315.
30 Id.
31 Id. at

315-16.

Id. at 316-17.
33 Id. at 317.
32
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fifth amendment rights which the search had violated. Secondly, the
Court made it clear that the waiver of these rights was not to be lightly
inferred. It found that the wife's acquiescence to the search was a
consequence of "implied coercion" on the part of the agents, thus
precluding any finding of waiver. However, the question of whether
one's rights could be waived by another party without his knowledge
34
or consent was left undecided.
The next Supreme Court decision which can be considered a
"consent" case, Davis v. United States,35 involved a violation of World
War II gas-rationing laws. Davis, a service station owner, was arrested
as a black marketeer after his attendant made an illegal sale to investigating agents.3 6 After obtaining the coupon box key from Davis and
examining his gasoline storage tanks, the agents informed him that
there was a discrepancy between the number of stamps and the quantity of fuel sold.3 7 Although Davis assured the agents that he had the

missing coupons in his inner office, during the course of an hour-long
interrogation he refused to open the office door.3 8 Not until he observed an agent shining a flashlight through a rear window of his inner
office in an apparent attempt to forcibly open the window did he relent,
saying: "He don't need to do that. I will open the damned door." 39
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, simply disregarded the
Amos waiver approach while nominally distinguishing that case on its
facts. 40 Far more concerned with the nature of the items seized and

the character of the place searched-the coupons were government
property and the place was a business premises-than he was with
the subject's consent, Justice Douglas found a valid consent in Davis'
41
rather grudging acquiescence.

Government searches, as Justice Douglas explained, had been
treated by the Court as involving "interplay" between fourth and fifth
amendment rights. These decisions had "largely developed out of cases
34 The implication in Amos that consent is a waiver issue, 255 U.S. at 317, coupled
with the Court's failure to distinguish fourth amendment rights from other constitutional
rights for purposes of determining the validity of the waiver, would subsequently have an
impact on lower federal and some state court decisions. See, e.g., Salata v. United States,
286 F. 125 (6th Cir. 1923); United States v. Kelih, 272 F. 484 (S.D. Il1. 1921); Meno v.
State, 197 Ind. 16, 164 N.E. 93 (1925).
35 328 US. 582 (1946).
36 Id. at 585.

37 Id. at 585-86.
38 Id. at 586.
39 Id. at 587.

40 Id. at 592-93.
41 Id. at 593.
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involving the search and seizure of private papers. ' 42 In this case,
however, the rationing coupons had never become the private property
of the holder. They "remained at all times the property of the Government and subject to inspection and recall by it."' 3 The defendant
was merely the custodian of government property. Thus, the "permissible limits of persuasion are not so narrow as where private papers
are sought. The demand [was] one of right.""
The factual distinctions between Amos and Davis were not quite
clear
as Justice Douglas made them appear. He characterized the
as
Amos search as one of a private residence, and the seizure as one involving private property. Yet, the initial search was of Amos' business,
and some of the agent's testimony concerned liquor seized from the
business premises. 45 Furthermore, the contraband liquor was no more
the private property of Amos than were the coupons the private prop42 Id. at 587-88 (emphasis in original). This general characterization of earlier search
and seizure cases failed to consider that under the "mere evidence" rule of Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), a companion case to Amos, private papers in which
the government had no interest other than for their evidentiary value could not be seized
at all.
Although search warrants have thus been used in many cases ever since the
adoption of the Constitution, and although their use has been extended from time
to time to meet new cases within the old rules, nevertheless it is clear that, at
common law and as the result of the Boyd and Weeks Cases, supra, they may not
be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely
for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a
criminal or penal proceeding, but that they may be resorted to only when a
primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the
public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right
to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be
taken.
Id. at 309.
43 328 U.S. at 588. See note 28 supra. The decision by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Davis, 151 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 582 (1946), drew a clearer
distinction between the consent issue and the regulatory nature of the search. 151 F.2d at
142. Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court, expressed "some doubt whether a
consent obtained under such circumstances should properly be regarded as 'voluntary.'"
Id. Nevertheless, while recognizing the judicial confusion concerning the permissible
scope of a search incident to arrest, the court upheld the seizure of the coupons as a
valid incident of Davis' arrest. Id. at 143-44.
Judge Frank's concurring opinion underscored the court's rejection of the government's contention that consent may automatically be implied in "regulatory" searches. Id.
at 144. On appeal, the government's position was ultimately adopted by the Supreme
Court. 328 U.S. at 588-89.
44 328 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added by the Court). For Judge Frank's rejection of this
argument see note 43 supra.
45 255 U.S. at 315. Although Amos deals solely with evidence seized from a search
of the home, the only consent indicated in the opinion was one which permitted a
search of the business premises. See id.
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erty of Davis. 40 Additionally, it would seem that the conduct of the
agents in Davis implied greater coercion than did the government's
"demand" to search in Amos.

47

Although Justice Douglas took into account all the surrounding
circumstances, it is clear that the nature of the business and the items
sought were crucial to his analysis. 48 The real distinction between
Amos and Davis must rest on the view that Davis, by engaging in a
46 The notion that contraband cannot be legally possessed or owned by anyone
except the state was discussed in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886). Justice
Bradley indicated:
[T]he seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to
avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at
least two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our own
Revenue Acts from the commencement of the Government.
Id. at 623 (footnote omitted). The Court, in dictum, further observed that
in the case of excisable or dutiable articles, the Government has an interest in
them for the payment of the duties thereon, and until such duties are paid has
a right to keep them under observation, or to pursue and drag them from
concealment ....
Id. at 624.
Although Boyd also excludes contraband from the category of unreasonable searches
and seizures, it does not, however, appear to except it from the warrant requirement. The
fact that the government may have a statutory or common law right to possession of
contraband articles does not, in itself, amount to a preemption of the warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52-54 (1951); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 31-33 (1925).
47 Davis was under arrest and was the actual person against whom the search
was directed. After explicit demands to search his office were not complied with, the
government agent took certain actions at the office window which the Court found to
constitute a threat to break in. 328 U.S. at 586-87. To the contrary, Amos' wife was not
the one under arrest, and her consent to search was obtained after a single, seemingly
polite request was made. 255 U.S. at 315. Also, unlike Amos' wife, Davis at first refused
to permit the search, and acquiesced only when it seemed that his refusal would
ultimately prove futile. 328 U.S. at 586-87.
The Court made it clear that the real distinction between the two cases rested on the
nature of the items sought.
Where the officers seek to inspect public documents at the place of business
where they are required to be kept, permissible limits of persuasion are not so
narrow as where private papers are sought. The demand is one of right. When the
custodian is persuaded by argument that it is his duty to surrender them and he
hands them over, duress and coercion will not be so readily implied as where
private papers are involved. The custodian in this situation is not protected against
the production of incriminating documents . . . . The strict test of consent,
designed to protect an accused against production of incriminating evidence,
has no place here. The right of privacy, of course, remains. But, as we have said,
the filling station was a place of business, not a private residence. The right to
inspect existed. And where one is seeking to reclaim his property which is unlawfully in the possession of another, the normal restraints against intrusion on
one's privacy, as we have seen, are relaxed.
Id. at 593 (emphasis added by the Court) (citation omitted).
48 See note 47 supra.
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business which involved the handling of documents considered to be
government property, had yielded a large measure of his fourth and
fifth amendment rights with respect to those papers. Thus, he had impliedly consented 49 to their governmental inspection. 50
The concept that one who does business with the government may
sacrifice some of his constitutional rights was emphasized more forcefully in Zap v. United States,51 a companion case to Davis. Zap, a naval

contractor, was charged with defrauding the government by "skimming
off" on a contract. 52 He was expressly required under the terms of his
contract to keep his books open to government inspection. F.B.I. agents
conducted an inspection over Zap's protest that they had no such
authority. The agents discovered an incriminating check which they
seized. 53 Zap did not consent to the taking of the check, as the Court
acknowledged, but as it also noted, "there was no wrongdoing in the
method by which the incriminating evidence was obtained." 54 The
Court found that Zap had waived his fourth and fifth amendment
rights when he agreed to permit inspection of his accounts and records
in return for obtaining government business. 55 Since the waiver in
effect occurred at the time the contract was signed, and therefore prior
49 The Davis decision may be considered as a bridge between the modern "implied
consent" doctrine and the common law property concepts, which permitted a wider
latitude in searches for property belonging to the searcher than for property owned
by the person whose premises were being searched.
50 Justice Marshall, in challenging Bustamonte's reliance on Davis, emphasized that
the "mere evidence" rule, although no longer viable, was critically important in shaping
the outcome of that case. He also observed that the Court in Davis "explicitly disclaimed stating a general rule for ordinary searches for evidence" because the documents
sought in that case were government property, 412 U.S. at 279 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Judge Hand, in his Second Circuit opinion in Davis, found that the defendant did not
forfeit any constitutional protections when dealing in a regulated business during a time
of national emergency. He refused to uphold the search as a regulatory inspection because
of the agents' failure to comply with procedural requirements for such inspections. He
did, however, find the seizure of the coupons lawful since they were obtained during a
search incident to an arrest. United States v. Davis, 151 F.2d 140, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
51 328 U.S. 624 (1946), rev'd mem., 330 U.S. 800 (1947).
52 See 328 U.S. at 626. Zap had a contract for experimental flight work with the Navy
under which he was to be paid on a cost-plus basis. He paid a pilot approximately $2,500
for the flight tests and then certified to the government that he had paid the pilot
$4,000. Id.
53 Id. at 627-28.
54

Id. at 630.

Id. The Court held that:
The waiver of such rights to privacy and to immunity as petitioner had respecting this business undertaking for the Government made admissible in
evidence all the incriminating facts.
55
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to the actual inspection, the Court recognized that the government
could have compelled production of all Zap's records and documents
related to the contract, including the check. 6
Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Zap also recognized the government's right to search the defendant's records on the basis of a contractual waiver. Consequently, he found it unnecessary to consider the
problem of voluntary consent. He distinguished, however, between the
right to search and the government's purported right to dispense with
57
fourth amendment requirements when making a seizure.
Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Davis,58 a classic explication of the
fourth amendment's genesis and purpose, 59 took issue with the government's right to conduct a search and seizure. His discussion of the
voluntariness issue was brief. Voluntariness, he said, means in law
simply "what everybody else means by it." 6 He believed the test should
have been "whether the consent obtained from Davis was, as a psychological fact, a voluntary act.""' He emphasized that the real underpinning of Davis was the nature of the items sought rather than the
nature of the consent obtained. To recognize a voluntary consent on
such a basis would "distort familiar notions on the basis of which the
62
law has heretofore adjudged legal consequences. '
The conceptual development of the elements of fourth amendment waiver was given further definition in Johnson v. United States
(hereinafter Johnson).63 Alerted by a confidential informer that persons
were smoking opium in the hotel where Johnson was staying, several.
federal narcotics agents and a Seattle detective went to the hotel. The
smell of burning opium in the hallway led them to Johnson's room.
They knocked, and after a slight delay during which they identified
themselves, Johnson opened the door. "The officer said, 'I want to
talk to you a little bit.' " Johnson then " 'stepped back acquiescently
and admitted [the officers].' "64 Johnson was then arrested, and a sub56 Id. at 628-29. Zap was subsequently reversed by the Court without opinion. 330
U.S. 800 (1947).
57 328 U.S. at 632 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
58 328 U.S. at 594-616. Justice Murphy joined in Justice Frankfurter's dissent. Id.
at 594. Justice Rutledge, in a separate dissent, stated that "Davis' so-called consent was
induced by [the flashlight-wielding officer's] apparent compulsion, the very kind of thing
the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent." Id. at 623.
59 Id. at 603-16.
60 Id. at 600.
61 Id.
62 Id.

63 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
64 Id. at 12.
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sequent search of her room revealed opium.6 5 The Court held that

her acquiescence to the officers' entry was not consent:
Entry to defendant's living quarters, which was the beginning
of the search, was demanded under color of office. It was granted
in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right.66
The Court's discussion of the consent issue in Johnson was even

briefer than the one in Amos. 67 The Johnson opinion, however, significantly added to the latter's characterization of consent as a waiver.
Johnson required, in addition, that the waiver be "understanding and
intentional. 68 1 In recognizing these elements, Justice Jackson, writing
for the Court, did not mention the standard for waiver of rights at
trial which had been established ten years earlier in Johnson v. Zerbst
(hereinafter Zerbst).69 However, his description of a valid fourth amendment waiver as "understanding and intentional" is similar to the
Zerbst description of waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 70 Further, Justice Jackson's
failure to cite or discuss either Davis or Zap, although those cases had
been decided only two years earlier, adds weight to the argument that
71
they should not be considered as typical consent search cases.
The Court next passed on the validity of a consent search in a
1968 case, Bumper v. North Carolina.72 The grandmother of a rape
suspect "consented" to a search of her house, in which the suspect was
65 Id.
66 Id. at 13. This paragraph comprised the Court's entire discussion of the consent issue.
67 See note 66 supra.
68 333 U.S. at 13.
69 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The issue in Zerbst was whether the defendant had waived
his right to counsel. Justice Black, writing for the majority, reasoned that a waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights had to be established by a clear showing of an
intelligent and competent waiver under the "particular facts and circumstances surrounding [each] case." Id. at 464. He further observed that the Court does "'not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.'" Id. (quoting from Ohio Bell Telephone
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
70 304 U.S. at 464.
71 Justice Douglas, author of Davis and Zap, was one of five Justices who joined in
Justice Jackson's majority opinion in Johnson. 333 U.S. at 11. Chief Justice Vinson and
Justices Black, Reed, and Burton dissented without opinion. Id. at 17.
72 391 U.S. 543 (1968). Although Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), was decided
before Bumper, it did not turn upon the question of voluntariness. However, it did raise
the issue of third party consent. The main thrust of that case was directed at whether a
hotel clerk could permit police to search the room of a guest who was a robbery suspect.
Id. at 487-88. For a more detailed discussion see pp. 257-58 inIra. Cf. United States v. Jeffers,

342 U.S. 48, 49-52 (1951).
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residing, after four law enforcement officers told her that they had a
warrant to search. 37 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated:
The issue thus presented is whether a search can be justified as
lawful on the basis of consent when the "consent" has been given
only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he
possesses a warrant.74We hold that there can be no consent under
such circumstances.
Citing several lower federal court decisions, the Supreme Court stated
for the first time that the prosecution "has the burden of proving that
the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. 75 Relying upon
both Amos and Johnson, Justice Stewart added:
This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority ...
When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a
home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant
has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion
there cannot be consent. 76
Bumper merely reiterated with approval the great weight of state
and lower federal court authority77 which had already decided the
question of the validity of "consents" granted in response to overt
assertions of official authority. However, the Court did add to the
Amos-Johnson consent test by placing the burden of establishing a free
78
and voluntary consent on the prosecution.
Thus, Amos, Johnson, and Bumper each held invalid a "consent"
that was no more than mere acquiescence to a demand under color of
lawful authority. These holdings were consistent with the waiver approach to fourth amendment rights, and only Bumper failed to rest
its holding explicitly on this waiver rationale. 79
391 U.S. at 546.
Id. at 548 (footnote omitted).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 548-50 (footnote omitted).
77 See pp. 227-40 infra.
78 391 U.S. at 548. The Court, however, was hampered by an ambiguous and contradictory record which indicated that the grandmother may have of her own volition
consented to the search. Id. at 547 & n.8. It, therefore, did not apply a "totality of the
circumstances" voluntariness standard.
Justice Black directed his vehement dissent in large part at the exclusionary rule. Id.
at 560-61. Further, he would have applied the totality approach and have found her consent valid. Id. at 555-57. In so arguing, Justice Black placed heavy emphasis on the personality and disposition of the consenting individual. Id. at 556-57 & nn.5 & 6.
79 Perhaps the rationale behind the Court's failure to broach the possibility of apply73

74
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The Court again confronted a possible consent issue in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire,0 but ultimately determined that the police activity
in question was neither a search nor seizure."' Coolidge was under investigation for murder and had already discussed the case with the
police. Two officers questioned his wife at the defendant's home 2 and
asked her whether her husband had any guns. Unaware that Coolidge,
who was then at the police station, had already shown three of his
guns to other officers during a previous visit, she replied, " 'Yes, I will
get them in the bedroom.'"83 The police accompanied her to the bedroom, where she took four guns out of the closet. Indicating to the
officers that she had nothing to hide, she surrendered the guns as well
4
as several articles of her husband's clothing.
Without once using the word "consent," Justice Stewart rejected
the argument that Mrs. Coolidge acted "as an 'instrument' of the officials, complying with a 'demand' made by them."8' 5 The conduct of the
officers was not "such as to make her actions their actions for purposes
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and their attendant exclusionary rules. '8 6 The Court acknowledged the forces impelling the wife
to cooperate with the police, particularly her desire to exonerate her
absent spouse. 7 However, Justice Stewart reasoned that the excluing a "totality of the circumstances" voluntariness test in these cases can be traced to
the blatant assertion of authority by the police in each situation.
80 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Two years prior to Coolidge, the Court decided Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), which involved a third party consent issue. Although the issue
was implicitly raised, however, the Court did not address itself to the voluntariness of the
consent. Frazier's cousin Rawls was placed under arrest in his home for a murder for
which Frazier was subsequently convicted. The police asked Rawls for his clothing, and
were directed to a duffel bag that Frazier and Rawls had used jointly during their
travels. Id. at 740. The Court simply noted, without explanation, that both Rawls and his
mother consented to the search of the bag. Id. It might have been argued that Rawls,
being under arrest, was inherently coerced into granting consent. The effect of the mother's
consent, apparently given at the same time Rawls consented, might also have been considered coerced. Therefore, by not addressing these potential issues, the Court added little
to the development of the law concerning the voluntariness test for consent searches, For
a more complete discussion of Frazier, see pp. 258-59 infra.
81 403 U.S. at 489-90.
82 Id. at 446.
83 Id. at 486.
84 Id. at 486.
85 Id. at 487.
86 Id.

Id. at 487-88. Other motivations may have been her desire for
openness and honesty, the fear that secretive behavior [would] intensify suspicion,
and uncertainty as to what course [would] most likely . . . be helpful to the
absent spouse.
Id. at 488.
87
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sionary rule was not fashioned to bar evidence obtained as a result of
these forces in the absence of official misconduct. 81 The wife's behavior
was considered to be simply "a spontaneous, good-faith effort by [her]
to clear [her spouse] of suspicion." 89 Thus, this episode was not treated
by Justice Stewart as one involving a consent search because no consent
to search was solicited. Nor was there a seizure since the wife relinquished the evidence of her own accord. 90
Supreme Court case law on consent searches prior to May, 1973,
might well be characterized as underdeveloped and uncomplicated.
Content to rest its decisions on broad generalities, the Court had not
yet undertaken the difficult task of providing the judiciary with specific guidelines. With the exceptions of Davis and Zap, the consent cases
were free of the close decisions, inconclusive holdings, and term-toterm inconsistencies that have bedeviled the Court on other fourth
amendment issues.91
A few general guidelines, however, did emerge in the developing
body of Supreme Court case law. A valid consent was considered to
represent a waiver of fourth amendment rights, with the government
bearing the burden of showing that a waiver had been validly obtained.
To be valid, the waiver had to be "understanding" and "intentional,"
and even implied coercion inherent in a show of governmental authority would invalidate the search. 92 Within these rather vague limits,
lower federal courts were left free to innovate.
STATE CONSENT CASES

A review of state court decisions which dealt with consent searches
prior to the Amos decision in 1921 indicates that these opinions did
very little to formulate workable rules of law in this area. These early
consent cases were based on a cause of action in trespass, and were resolved by submission of the consent question to the jury.9 3 If a crim88 See id. at 489.
89 Id. at 490 (footnote omitted).
90 Id. at 489. It should be noted that Bustamonte, written by Justice Stewart, relied
on Coolidge's "totality of the circumstances" test, for determining the voluntariness of a
consenting party's cooperation with the police. 412 U.S. at 234 n.15.
91 See note 1 supra.
92 The Court has indicated, however, that the subject of the consent need not be free
of all pressure, since even a party under arrest could conceivably furnish valid consent.
See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
93 See, e.g., McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368, 98 N.W. 881 (1904); Grim v. Robison,
31 Neb. 540, 48 N.W. 388 (1891). In McClurg, the Iowa supreme court overturned a directed
verdict for the defendants based on the plaintiff's alleged consent to a nighttime search of

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:211

inal offense was charged, the issue would be conveniently disposed of
on the ground that the validity of consent was immaterial since the
evidence seized would still be admissible at trial. 4 It was not until
after Amos that many state courts began a systematic analysis of consent searches, most of which arose in investigations of violations of
prohibition under the Volstead Act.9 5
The Waiver Approach

One such carefully reasoned opinion was Meno v. State.9 After
being confronted with what turned out to be an invalid warrant to
search his "dry beer" establishment, the defendant told state and
federal officers, "go right on and search." 97 The Indiana court, influenced by Amos as well as by several lower federal and state decisions,
held that the defendant's actions "did not constitute an invitation to
search or a waiver of his rights under the Constitution against searches
98
and seizures.
his premises. The court felt that the actions and testimony of the city officials who conducted the warrantless search raised a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the consent.
123 Iowa at 371-72, 98 N.W. at 882. In Grim, the Nebraska supreme court recognized consent to be a valid defense to a trespass action filed against the owner of stolen property
seeking its recovery. 31 Neb. at 542-43, 48 N.W. at 389. In Smith v. McDuffee, 72 Ore. 276,
142 P. 558 (1914), these two decisions comprised part of a discussion dealing with the
waiver of constitutional protection against searches and seizures. In Smith, voluntariness
was found where the plaintiff's wife acted "like any other honest person" under the circumstances and permitted a search. Id. at 286-87, 142 P. at 561.
94 It was not until after the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961), that the states were bound under the federal exclusionary rule set out in Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). Nonetheless, many states had already adopted
statutory provisions to protect against abuses by their own law enforcement officers in the
course of securing evidence. 367 U.S. at 652 n.7. But see State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34
A. 1046 (1896); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 76 N.E. 127 (1905). In Tucker,
evidence found after police officers had accepted the invitation of defendant's mother to
search the premises was admitted on the basis that no abuse of process had occurred, even
though the search went beyond the limits of the original warrant. The lack of authority
to consent to a search was found to be immaterial since a trespass by the police would
give rise to a civil action. Id. at 468-70, 76 N.E. at 131. The Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut in Griswold adopted the narrow view that the state constitutional limitation
on searches and seizures restricted only legislative action and court rules, and did not
apply to unauthorized, illegal police activity. Moreover, the court construed Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), as applying only to written incriminating evidence and not
"mere inanimate goods" taken from the defendant. 67 Conn. at 305-07, 34 A. at 1047-48.
For a discussion of Boyd see note 46 supra.
95 National Prohibition Act of 1919, ch. 85, tit. II, 41 Stat. 307 (repealed 1935).
96 197 Ind. 16, 164 N.E. 93 (1925).
97 Id. at 20, 164 N.E. at 94-95.
98 Id. at 24, 164 N.E. at 96. In circumstances such as these, where an improper display
of authority preceded the consent, courts were generally protective of the rights of de-
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Other state courts, realizing that a valid consent required more
than the mere submission to a request to search, denied the admissibility of evidence obtained without a warrant where the suspect did not
protest or indicate his lack of consent. 9 Thereafter, in many jurisdictions the waiver concept was raised to the level of a presumption
against the relinquishment of basic constitutional protections; acquiescence would no longer suffice to abrogate personal rights of such
magnitude. A strong statement of this principle was articulated by the
Wyoming supreme court in Tobin v. State,10 0 in which a consent
search undertaken without a warrant was invalidated:
First of all, we believe that a waiver of the citizen's fundamental constitutional rights must appear by clear and positive
testimony, and, if the search and seizure are based upon the proposition that consent was given to the officers, there should be no
question about it in the evidence submitted.

.. . The courts do not put the citizen in the position of

either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his con-

stitutional privileges.
And therefore evidence obtained by search can only be used
where the testimony clearly shows that the consent was really
voluntary and with a desire to invite search, and not done merely
to avoid resistance. 101
Thus, from its inception, the acceptance of the waiver rationale expressed in Amos gained momentum in the state courts and became the
prevailing view in a majority of states by the late 1930's.102 Nevertheless, there remained a few jurisdictions which did not look beyond the
103
mere act of acquiescence itself.
fendants. See, e.g., People v. Reid, 315 111. 597, 146 N.E. 504 (1925); Morton v. State, 136
Miss. 284, 101 So. 379 (1924).
99 State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 351-58, 259 S.W. 100, 101-02 (1924); People v. Jakira,
118 Misc. 303, 309, 193 N.Y.S. 306, 312 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1922). In a fact situation almost identical to that in Amos, the Kentucky court of appeals in Duncan v. Commonwealth, 198
Ky. 841, 250 S.W. 101 (1923), found that consent resulting from implied coercion was not
effective. Id. at 842, 250 S.W. at 102. Duncan was subsequently overruled on other grounds
in Commonwealth v. Sebastian, 500 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky. 1973).
100 36 Wyo. 368, 255 P. 788 (1927).
101 Id. at 373-74, 255 P. at 789. Other courts had recognized that a party may consent
to a waiver of constitutional rights merely because the proposition is supported by the
great weight of authority. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 241 Mich. 616, 619-22, 217 N.W. 797,
798 (1928); cf. Hampton v. State, 148 Tenn. 155, 158-59, 252 S.W. 1007, 1008 (1923).
102 See Note, Searches and Seizures-Effect of Coercion-Waiver of Constitutional

Privilege by Wife in Husband's Absence, 37 MIcH.
103 See, e.g., Smuk v. People, 72 Colo. 97, 209
859, 143 S.W.2d 273 (1940); State v. Bliss, 18 S.W.2d
Waiver by acquiescence maintained its vitality

L. Rav. 1155, 1155 (1939).
P. 636 (1922); State v. Burney, 346 Mo.
509 (Mo. 1929).
in Missouri until its recent rejection in
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The Totality of the CircumstancesApproach
California is the most notable of those jurisdictions which have
not adopted the waiver language. That state's wide latitude toward a
consent given to law enforcement officials has been the subject of critical comment. 0 4 People v. Michael'0 5 is one example of a prominent
California decision which is notable for its failure to apply the waiver
principle. Although significant in its own right for its effect upon the
development of California consent search law, Michael, authored by
Justice Traynor, takes on even greater importance because it became
the touchstone for the Supreme Court's formulation of the "totality of
the circumstances" test advanced in Bustamonte.'0 6
The factual circumstances which gave rise to the "California rule"
in Michael involved a request by police officers to the mother of a drug
suspect for "any narcotics in the house."'10 7 The mother produced a
bottle containing a narcotic drug and stated: "This is all [my daughter]
has."' 10 8 The defendant daughter thereupon admitted knowledge of the
narcotic substance, and, after further questioning, produced additional
drugs and related paraphenalia.' 0 9 The Michael court reasoned that
while a mere failure to resist a search is not consent, these individuals
had not asserted their rights against a warrantless search and had submitted to a courteous request without any strong showing of authority.
Therefore, the result was a unanimous finding of a valid consent by
both women. 110
The opinion emphasized the point, later exaggerated by the Supreme Court in Bustamonte, that a contrary holding would seriously
hinder officers in performing official duties. The court reasoned that in
order to defeat a prosecution, the suspect would merely have to voluntarily reveal all the evidence damaging to himself and then allege
"that he acted only in response to an implied assertion of unlawful
State v. Witherspoon, 460 S.W.2d 281, 287-88 (Mo. 1970). However, this result was undoubtedly presaged in State v. Young, 425 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. 1968), where the state supreme court
ieadopted its prior standard announced in State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100
(1924). But see note 126 infra.
104 See Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating
Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. IL. L.F. 78,
115-18; Note, Criminal Law: Search and Seizure: New Limitations on the California Doctrine of Consent to Search, 51 CALiF. L. REv. 1010, 1010 (1963).
105 45 Cal. 2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955).
106 412 U.S. at 227.
107 45 Cal. 2d at 752, 290 P.2d at 853.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 754, 290 P.2d at 854.
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authority."'1- Although Michael did not allude to any "waiver" of
constitutional rights, neither can it properly be read to exclude such
an approach. No arguments were raised against the concept in the
court's decision. The court merely recognized that the individual
characteristics of the person granting consent should be considered
112
in resolving the voluntariness of the consent question.
The Warnings Approach
113
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona,
very few state cases had dealt with the question of whether a person
had to be informed of his right not to consent before a consent could
be valid. 11 4 The Miranda Court held that a suspect could validly waive
his right to be free from self-incrimination and his right to counsel only
if he had been specifically advised of these fifth and sixth amendment
rights at the outset. 1 5 Subsequent to Miranda, state courts were faced
with the question of whether similar warnings had to be given before
a party consenting to a search could waive his fourth amendment
rights. 116
The post-Miranda state cases dealing with this question can be
divided into two different categories. Some of the cases held that if
Miranda warnings had been given to an in-custody suspect, it was unnecessary to give a separate warning advising him of his right to refuse
consent to a search. 1 These courts relied on the reasoning that Miranda warnings adequately served to put the suspect on notice of his
right not to consent. 118 Although this approach does not require special
fourth amendment warnings, it nonetheless recognizes the need for some
111 Id. See 412 U.S. at 230 (quoting from People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d at 754, 290 P.2d
at 854 (1955)).
112 45 Cal. 2d at 753, 290 P.2d at 854.
113 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
114 But see, e.g., People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 363-65, 100 N.W.2d 456, 461 (1960).
"15 384 U.S. at 444-45.
116 See generally Comment, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 130 (1967).
117 Sleziak v. State, 454 P.2d 252 (Alas.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 921 (1969). The court
observed:
[WMe hold that it was not necessary to advise appellant of his fourth amendment
rights after appellant had been advised of his right to remain silent and of his
right to the presence of either retained or appointed counsel ....
454 P.2d at 259 (emphasis added). For further cases on this point see State v. Frisby, 245
A.2d 786 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968); State v. Leavitt, 103 R.I. 273, 237 A.2d 309, cert. denied,
393 U.S. 881 (1968).
118 These courts generally followed the rule set forth in Gorman v. United States,
380 F.2d 158, 164 (1st Cir. 1967) that "an automatic second-warning system misunderstands and downgrades the warnings required by Miranda." See pp. 235-36 infra.
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form of warning. Other courts simply regarded warnings as unnecessary,119 but they failed, however, to develop a cogent rationale to
justify treating a waiver of fourth amendment rights as inferior to
120
fifth and sixth amendment rights.

Although some courts, exemplified by Michael, have developed
the "totality of the circumstances" test for determining the voluntariness of the consent, the majority of state courts, while not going so far
as to adopt a specific warnings requirement, have embraced the waiver
approach.'2 1 An application of this waiver theory requires that the
government prove that the person voluntarily and intelligently consented to the search with the knowledge that he need not have done
so. It is significant that this majority position paralleled the approach
developed by most federal courts in dealing with consent searches.
LOWER FEDERAL CONSENT CASES

While the weight of state authority generally characterized consent
to search as a waiver of fourth amendment rights, federal case law appears to have adopted an even stronger position regarding knowing
119 See People v. Roberts, 246 Cal. App. 2d 715, 55 Cal. Rptr. 62 (Ct. App. 1966); State
v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968); People v. Ledferd, 38 Ill. 2d 607, 232 N.E.2d
684 (1967); State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967); State v. McKnight, 52 N.J.
35, 53 n.4, 243 A.2d 240, 250 (1968); State v. Lyons, 76 Wash. 2d 343, 458 P.2d 30 (1969).
120 See, e.g., State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967), in which the court
relies on the needs of law enforcement to justify consent searches without warnings:
[The United States Supreme Court has not applied the Miranda test to searches
and seizures. Until it does so, if it ever does, we should not further shackle law
enforcement.
Id. at 761, 150 N.W.2d at 917-18. But see State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 119-20, 427 P.2d
616, 619-20 (1967), where the court draws a constitutional distinction between the purposes of the fourth amendment and those of the fifth amendment.
121 See, e.g., State v. Leavitt, 103 R.I. 273, 237 A.2d 309, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 881
(1968). The court stated:
We are unrestrainedly in accord with the proposition that an accused's consent to
a search is a waiver of the protection guaranteed to him by the constitutions of
this state and the United States.
103 R.I. at 289, 237 A.2d at 318. See also State v. Kananen, 97 Ariz. 233, 235, 237-38, 399 P.2d
Ind. , 279 N.E.2d 196, 202 (1972); People v.
426, 427, 429 (1965); Sayne v. State, Kaigler, 368 Mich. 281, 295, 118 N.W.2d 406, 413 (1962); State v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, 239, 154
S.E.2d 61, 65 (1967); Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 84, 190 A.2d 709, 711 (1963). But
see State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110 (1965). The New Jersey supreme court adopted
the position that "[w]hen an accused consents to a search of his premises, he relinquishes the
Fourth Amendment protection which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at
352, 209 A.2d at 113. The court refrained from using waiver terminology, but it did require, however, that the consent be voluntary and that it "be 'unequivocal and specific' and
'freely and intelligently given.' " Id. The court thus examined all the facts and determined
the consent to be valid under the "totality of the particular circumstances." Id. at 353, 209
A.2d at 114.
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waiver. Although early state court opinions on the consent issue frequently cited Amos as persuasive authority, the lower federal courts
were of course bound by that decision.
Enforcement of prohibition through the Volstead Act 22 was the
major stimulus to the development of federal consent search law.
However, even before Amos, a federal court, finding a gun-point "invitation" to search a home to be involuntary, took note of the disturbing
implications of aggressive law enforcement ushered in by the Volstead
Act. x23 A federal district court, in another pre-Amos decision, found a
consent necessarily to be "a waiver of constitutional rights.' 1 24 The
court held that the acquiescent invitation, "[a]ll right; go ahead,"
communicated to a prohibition agent flashing his badge, constituted no
such waiver, "but, on the contrary . . . [this] peaceful submission to
officers of the law" was merely obeisance to authority and did not
125
qualify as a valid waiver.
Federal decisions coming after Amos referred to consent as a
waiver of rights 26 that was required to be shown by "clear and positive
testimony.' ' 27 The significance of the courts' reluctance in these earlier
cases to find a valid consent in a mere statement of assent may, however, have been diluted by the fact that some of these cases tended to
involve consent "requests" based on invalid warrants 128 or other blatant displays of authority. 129 As police requests were tendered in an
increasingly sophisticated fashion, courts became more concerned with
the circumstances surrounding the consent.18 0 However, the waiver
concept was not lost. Particularly after the decision in Zerbst, with its
admonition that "[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquish122 National Prohibition Act of 1919, ch. 85, tit. II,41 Stat. 307.
123 United States v. Marquette, 271 F. 120, 122 (N.D. Cal. 1920), aff'd, 270 F. 214 (9th
Cir. 1921). The trial court commented that
[t]he outlawing of liquor by the Eighteenth Amendment did not abrogate either
the Fourth or Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and the zeal of the enforcement officers in pursuing this recent outlaw cannot be permitted to carry them
without warrant across the threshold of the home.
271 F. at 122.
124 United States v. Slusser, 270 F. 818, 819 (S.D. Ohio 1921).
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Ray v. United States, 84 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1936); Farris v. United
States, 24 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 607 (1928); United States v. Kelih,
272 F. 484, 490-91 (S.D. Iii. 1921).
127 United States v. Kelih, 272 F. 484, 490-91 (S.D. Ill. 1921).
128 See, e.g., id. at 488.
129 See, e.g., Ray v. United States, 84 F.2d 654, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1936); Farris v. United
States, 24 F.2d 639, 639 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 607 (1929).
1so See, e.g., United States v. Arrington, 215 F.2d 630, 635-37 (7th Cir. 1954); Judd v.
United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,"' 131 the waiver
requirement gained status as a crucial issue in cases where consent
involved relinquishment of constitutional rights.
In Judd v. United States,132 a frequently cited pre-Miranda decision, the District of Columbia Circuit held that a simple verbal act of
permission was inadequate to constitute a valid waiver. 133 Emphasizing
that the consenting party was under arrest at the time he granted permission 34 and that the permission itself was a rather weak acquiescence, 13 5 the court held the consent void and reaffirmed the concept that
consent requires an intelligent and uncoerced waiver. 136 In the court's
37
view, even "false bravado" might well fall short of voluntary consent.
This case inferentially raises, but leaves unanswered, the question of
whether a valid waiver requires a specific showing that the consenting
party had been previously informed of his right to withhold consent.
The issue of whether a request for a waiver of fourth amendment
rights need be preceded by advice of the right to refuse was later dismissed by the Supreme Court in Bustamonte, with the casual observation that this "suggestion ...has been almost universally repudiated by
both federal and state courts.' ' 3 8 Although the Court referred to
304 U.S. at 464.
190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
133 Id. at 651-52.
134 Id. at 651.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 652.
137 Id. at 651. In the subsequent decision of Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819,
820 (D.C. Cir. 1954), the same court made clear its skepticism concerning the validity of
any apparent consent obtained from one who is the object of an investigation or prosecution.
138 412 U.S. at 231 (footnotes omitted). The Court, however, did recognize that some
federal courts had construed the waiver concept as requiring specific warnings. Id. n.13.
In United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966), for example, the court in dictum
determined that the arresting officer's failure to apprise the suspect of his fourth amendment right while he was in custody invalidated the consent. Id. at 744. Nikrasch relied in
part on United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966), which had expressly
held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment requires no less knowing a waiver than do the Fifth
and Sixth." Id. at 269. The Blalock court reasoned:
To require law enforcement agents to advise the subjects of investigation of their
right to insist on a search warrant would impose no great burden, nor would it
unduly or unnecessarily impede criminal investigation.
Id. at 269-70. Having decided that the absence of warnings automatically invalidated the
possibility of a valid waiver, the court in Blalock found it unnecessary to reach the issue
of voluntariness. Id. See discussion pp. 260-61 infra.
In a later case, United States v. Moderacki, 280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968), the court,
relying on Nikrasch and Blalock, held separate consent search warnings to be an absolute
prerequisite to a valid waiver of fourth amendment rights, and discerned that Miranda
131

132
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several federal appellate cases to support this far-reaching assertion, 3 9
analysis discloses that some of these cases did not reject the notion of
warnings outright. In Gorman v. United States,140 for example, the
First Circuit stressed the fact that the arrested suspect had already
received Miranda warnings,' 4 1 but nothing in Gorman intimated that
an unknown right could be validly waived. The court reasoned that
implicit in the Miranda warnings was the admonition that items found
in a search could be used against the suspect. 142 Miranda warnings
were deemed adequate to place the suspect on notice of his right to
withhold any information from the police. One warning at the outset
sufficed for the interrogation, and a request for consent did not involve
"a different order of risks ... not ... covered at the threshold" by the
Miranda warnings. 1 43 Civilized police standards were the objectives
of rules governing searches, and in the court's view, this objective was
satisfied by Mirandawarnings given at the outset of the arrest. 144 Thus,
'in this context, specific warnings of the right to withhold consent were
145
not necessary.
warnings did not offer adequate notice of the right not to consent to a search. 280 F. Supp.
at 636. The court propounded the view that
[i]acking an explicit warning as to his rights under the Fourth Amendment, it
can never be known with certainty whether a defendant voluntarily waived those
rights.
Id. (footnote omitted). Although the constitutional premise postulated in this line of cases
has been questioned, criticized, and ultimately overruled in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973), these decisions nonetheless demonstrate that some lower federal courts
were in the process of developing a consent search standard which mandated the communication of specific fourth amendment warnings as a condition precedent to a valid waiver.
189 412 U.S. at 231 n.13.
140 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967).
141 Id. at 161, 164.
142 Id. at 164. Bustamonte's ostensible reliance on United States v. Noa, 443 F.2d 144
(9th Cir. 1971), and United States v. Goosbey, 419 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970) is misplaced for
the same reason. 412 U.S. at 231 n.13. In both Noa and Goosbey the defendants had received adequate Miranda warnings. 443 F.2d at 147; 419 F.2d at 819. At a minimum, such
warnings placed the subjects on notice that they had the right to remain silent. Such
right arguably includes the right to withhold verbal assent to a request for a search.
143 380 F.2d at 164.
144 Id.
145 The Gorman court appears to have propounded two theories for rejecting the
necessity of specific fourth amendment warnings. The first view perceives that threshold
Miranda warnings protect against the same order of risks as is involved in the search of
a suspect's premises. The alternate position interprets Miranda warnings as sufficient to
maintain civilized police standards, thereby ostensibly satisfying the objective of reasonableness under the fourth amendment. Id.
Under either view, however, one can argue that the court did not intend to preclude
the possibility of fourth amendment warnings being given where Miranda warnings were
not applicable. This "no warning" decision, therefore, should be confined to the facts of
this case.
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Judge Coffin, the author of Gorman, had no difficulty in applying
the Zerbst waiver standard t4 while nonetheless holding that a consent
1 47
to search need not be entirely free from pressure to waive rights.
The case involved purported consents- obtained from two robbery suspects. 148 Defendant Roche, although neither under arrest nor in custody, had been given Miranda warnings. After discussing his purported
sales business, interviewing agents asked for permission to check his
luggage. "Be my guest," he replied. 149 The court was of the opinion
that the repeated warnings to the suspect by the police that he need
not talk at all provided a good example of fair and efficient police investigative practices. It was true that he faced a dilemma; a search
would lead to his arrest, while refusal to permit the search would
harden the agent's already strong suspicions. But pressure from the
realization that the "jig [was] up" did not render the apparent consent
ineffective. 150 Gorman, therefore, is particularly significant in that the
First Circuit required knowledge of the right to refuse cooperation' 5 '
and found such knowledge here.152 Knowing waiver was deemed sufficient to validate the consent, notwithstanding that such consent may
well have been the product of pressure generated by the unhappy
circumstances in which the consent subjects found themselves.
Another decision noteworthy for its emphasis on the elements of
waiver was Rosenthall v. Henderson.las In that case, the Sixth Circuit,
in affirming a grant of federal habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner,
underscored the view that consent to a search "must be unequivocal,
specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, and is not lightly to be inferred."'154 Police failure to give warnings
about the right to refuse consent is only one factor to be considered,
and its weight varies. 55 Awareness of one's right to withhold consent
Id. at 163.
Id. at 165.
148 The first consent was given by defendant Gorman at the police station after he
was arrested and had been given proper Miranda warnings. In response to a request by
an FBI agent to search his motel room, Gorman replied: "Go ahead; look in the room."
Id. at 161.
149 Id. at 162.
150 Id. at 165.
151 The fact that Gorman expressly indicated that knowing waiver was essential to
valid consent, contrasts sharply with the Court's view in Bustamonte that an advice requirement would tend to destroy consent searches as an investigative aid. Compare id. at
163, with 412 U.S. at 231-32.
152 380 F.2d at 163.
153 389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968).
154 Id. at 515-16 (citing Simmons v. Bomar, 349 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1965)).
155 389 F.2d at 516.
146
147
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was considered to be the central issue in this case, and without such
awareness, however obtained, there could be no valid consent.'56 The
court in Rosenthall found nothing in the record " 'to indicate that
petitioner was in fact aware of his right to refuse to give his consent.' "157
The approach of other circuits to consent searches on the particular issue of waiver do not appear to vary significantly from the reasoning of Gorman and Rosenthall.158 While the circumstances surrounding the consent were explored in these cases, it was never hinted
that a "totality of the circumstances" test could override an "intelligent relinquishment" requirement. In Perkins v. Henderson,159 for example, the Fifth Circuit found invalid a consent to search obtained
from a burglary suspect who was not in custody or under arrest, and
who was, furthermore, the cousin of one of the interrogating officers.' 60
The invalidity of the consent apparently rested on the failure of the
officers to inform the suspect of his right to refuse consent. Referring
to Zerbst, the court emphasized that fourth amendment rights must
be knowingly and intelligently relinquished, commenting that "[a]
simple admonition by the officers that the search could not and would
not be conducted without [petitioner's] consent would have sufficed."''
Significantly, in Bretti v. Wainwright,16 2 the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed
the critical importance of the knowledge factor. It was able to uphold
the validity of a consent largely because the state robbery suspect was
advised that he need not consent, despite the possibility that the voluntariness of the consent may have been tainted by coercion due to an
unlawful arrest. 1 63 Thus, these cases demonstrate that the assertion

that specific warnings do not constitute an absolute prerequisite was
not as "universal" as the Bustamonte Court would have one believe. 64
Id.
Id. (quoting from the unreported memorandum opinion of the district court).
158 See, e.g., United States v. Hayward, 471 F.2d 388, 389-90 (7th Cir. 1972); Rees v.
Peyton, 341 F.2d 859, 862 (4th Cir. 1965); Burge v. United States, 332 F.2d 171, 173 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 883 (1964).
159 418 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1969).
160 Id. at 442.
161 Id.
162 439 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971).
163 439 F.2d at 1045-46. The court specifically observed:
In the instant case the presence of these [Miranda] warnings leads us to conclude
that any coercion flowing from the possible illegality of appellant's arrest was
dissipated.
Id. at 1046.
164 See note 138 supra and accompanying text. For cases contrary to the Bustamonte
156

157
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The decisions of the Ninth Circuit are singularly illustrative of the
general approach espoused by the federal circuits that a consent to
search requires a clear showing of knowing waiver. No federal court of
appeals had surpassed the Ninth Circuit in articulating the proposition
that the waiver inherent in a consent search must be made with
knowledge of the fourth amendment rights which the subject is
waiving. 165 The requirement of a showing of such knowledge, on the
part of either federal or state defendants, was stringently enforced by
that court as to consent subjects not under arrest as well as to searches
of places not generally considered as intrusive as the search of a residence. 166
In Cipres v. United States,167 customs agents asked a prospective

airline passenger, whom they suspected of smuggling marijuana, if they
could search her bags. Denying that they contained drugs, she answered, "Yes, I have nothing to hide," but claimed that she had left her
keys in New York. The agents examined the bags, found them unlocked, and discovered the marijuana inside. 68 The court emphasized
that the central issue was whether the suspect had waived her constitutional immunity from unreasonable search and seizure. 69 In reaching
a determination of this issue, the court propounded the following standard:
Waiver, in this context, means the "intentional relinquishment of
a known right or privilege." . . . Such a waiver cannot be conclu-

sively presumed from a verbal expression of assent. The court must
determine from all the circumstances whether the verbal assent
reflected an understanding, uncoerced, and unequivocal election
to grant the officers a license which the person knows may be freely
and effectively withheld. .... The crucial question is whether the
citizen truly consented to the search, not whether it was reasonable
for the officers to suppose that he did.170

Although it remanded the case for further examination of the
view, see United States v. Nickrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Moderacki,
280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
165 See Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1971); Schoepflin v.
United States, 391 F.2d 390, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 865 (1968); Cipres v.
United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826 (1966).
166 See Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1971) (search of an
automobile belonging to a suspect not under arrest); Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95,
97 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826 (1966) (search of luggage owned by a suspect
not under arrest).
167 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826 (1966).
168 Id. at 97.
169 Id. at 98.
170 Id. at 97-98 (citation & footnotes omitted).
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facts in light of this consent test, the court found a "number of circumstances [suggesting] that her assent may have reflected less than a
free, deliberate, and unequivocal decision."''
Thus, one can infer
from its treatment of the consent issue that the court found no inconsistency between an absolute knowledge requirement at the threshold of a consent determination, and, once this threshold requirement
had been satisfied, an application of a "totality of the circumstances"
test to determine whether the consent was voluntary in other respects.
Three years later, in Schoepflin v. United States,172 the same court
placed even more emphasis on the actual knowledge requirement. It
remanded a consent search case with instructions to the district court
to make separate findings on the question of actual knowledge of the
right to withhold consent, and on the issue of whether the "consent to
173
the search was coerced or uncoerced."'
In deciding Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, a habeas corpus action,
the Ninth Circuit found the California approach to consent searches
unacceptable. The "totality of the circumstances" test developed in
Michael was deemed insufficient to define the validity of a consent
search:
It would appear that the California courts, in addition to finding
that the atmosphere was not coercive, have ....

[R]easoned that

the mere request for consent carries with it an implication that
consent may be withheld and that knowledge of this implication
174
may be inferred from assent.
Although the Ninth Circuit may have gone further than most
federal courts in explicitly requiring a showing of knowledge of the
right to withhold permission to search, it could fairly be said that by
the time Bustamonte was appealed to the Supreme Court, the federal
courts had developed a coherent consent doctrine. The Ninth Circuit
was clearly in line with the consensus that consent to search is a waiver
of fundamental rights that must be knowing and intelligent. The California approach, on the other hand, represented a minority position
even among the states.'17 Although the federal courts looked to the
totality of the circumstances in determining whether a consent was
voluntary, they did not treat the knowledge factor merely as a dispensable component of the "totality of the circumstances" test. Know171 Id. at 98.

391
391
174 448
175 For
172

173

text.

F.2d 390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 865 (1968).
F.2d at 399.
F.2d at 700.
a discussion of state court decisions see notes 93-121 supra and accompanying
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ing waiver was considered a threshold issue-a condition precedent to
the question of voluntariness.
BUSTAMONTE-A BREAK WITH THE PAST

7 6 the Supreme Court, after a full
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,1
half-century of developing case law, attempted a definitive formulation
of the requisite elements to a consent search. The facts of the case are
not complex. An automobile driven by a party who had neither a
driver's license nor identification was stopped for a minor traffic
1 77
offense by a police officer. The petitioner was a passenger in the car.
In what the officer described as a "congenial setting," the six male

occupants of the car were ordered to get out. 178 Although no one was

under arrest or threatened with arrest, two additional police were
soon on the scene. 179 None of the men owned the car, but one of the
passengers, Alcala, said that it belonged to his brother. Asked whether
the officers could search the car, Alcala replied, "Sure, go ahead," and
actually assisted the officers in opening the trunk of the car.'8 0 The
police discovered three stolen checks which were used as evidence in
a trial in which Bustamonte was convicted of unlawful possession.
A California court of appeals found the consent valid and affirmed
the conviction;' 8 ' thereafter, the California supreme court denied review. 182 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, set aside a federal district court order denying habeas corpus
relief,' 1 and, relying on prior case law, 8 4 held that the record was insufficient to establish the voluntariness of Alcala's consent. 185 It ap176 412 U.S. 218 (1973), rev'g 448 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1971).
177 412 U.S. at 220. While Bustamonte had no. proprietary interest in the vehicle
searched and was merely one of six passengers, he was the party aggrieved by the search,
so he had standing to object to the admission of the evidence obtained as a result of the
search. See generally Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 260-67 (1960).
178 412 U.S. at 220.
179 Id.
180 Id.

181 People v. Bustamonte, 270 Cal. App. 2d 648, 652, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20 (Ct. App.
1969).
182 See 412 US. at 221 & n.2 where the Court acknowledges that the order of the
Supreme Court of California is unreported.
183 448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1971).
184 See Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 865
(1968); Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826 (1966).
For further discussion of Schoepflin and Cipres, see notes 167-173 supra and accompanying
text.
185 448 F.2d at 700-01.
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peared to the Ninth Circuit that "the California courts, in addition to
finding that the atmosphere was not coercive, have relied entirely on
the verbal expression of assent."' 186 The Supreme Court reversed, asserting that this approach "finds no support in any of our decisions that
have attempted to define the meaning of 'voluntariness.' "187
The Supreme Court's holding in Bustamonte was purportedly a
narrow one. For the first time, the Court drew a distinction between
consent by a subject who is in custody and consent by a subject who is
not. The decision applied only "when the subject of a search is not in
custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his
consent. '"188 When the consent is made under these circumstances, its
voluntariness
is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances,
and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to
be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary
consent. 189

The Court reached this holding, limited to noncustodial consent
situations, by adopting the "totality of the circumstances test," which
had been developed in a long series of pre-Miranda cases dealing with
the voluntariness of confessions obtained from in-custody defendants1 9°
In the Court's view, the pre-Miranda cases recognized that a confession
was voluntary if it was " 'the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.' "91
[T]he totality of all the surrounding circumstances [include] both
the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation...
186 Id. The court continued:
They have reasoned that the mere request for consent carries with it an implication that consent may be withheld and that knowledge of this implication may be
inferred from assent. Yet, as we have noted, mere verbal assent is not enough.
Further, in our view, the "implication" apparently relied upon by the California
courts can hardly suffice as a general rule. Under many circumstances a reasonable
person might read an officer's "May I" as the courteous expression of a demand
backed by force of law.
Id.
187 412 U.S. at 229. In reversing the circuit court, the Court explicitly adopted the
California view of voluntariness of consent and rejected the position developed in federal
case law which the Ninth Circuit had espoused. Id. at 227-33. See pp. 230-31 supra; pp. 23240 supra.
188 412 U.S. at 248.
189 Id. at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
190 Id. at 223-27.
191 Id. at 225 (quoting from Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 US. 568, 602 (1961)).
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The significant fact about all of these decisions is that none
of them turned on the presence or absence of a single controlling
criterion . . . . In none of them did the Court rule that the Due
Process Clause required the prosecution to prove as part of its
initial burden that the defendant knew
he had a right to refuse
92
to answer the questions that were put.
"Similar considerations" led the Court to apply the "totality of the
circumstances" test to consent searches, under which knowledge of the
right to refuse was not essential to an effective consent. 193 The same
"two competing concerns" which had been reconciled in the pre-Miranda confession cases-"the legitimate need for such searches and the
equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion"were similarly harmonized by the Court in determining the nature of
a "voluntary" consent. 194
Police interest in such searches was deemed strong indeed.
Officers operating on suspicion, but without probable cause, may have
no other "means of obtaining important and reliable evidence."' 195
Such evidence may not only lead to conviction of the guilty but exoneration of the innocent. Even if there is probable cause to arrest or
search, a consent search may, if it turns up nothing, spare the subject
of the search the "stigma and embarrassment" of an arrest or a far
more extensive search pursuant to a warrant.196
With regard to coercion, the Court reasoned that consent searches
must be subjected to "the most careful scrutiny" to assure that they
are not the product of even "subtly coercive police questions" or of
the subject's possible "vulnerable subjective state." Under this test,
which the Court reasoned would filter out "searches that are the
product of police coercion," the "continuing validity of consent
searches" will be preserved. "In sum, there is no reason . . . to depart
in the area of consent searches, from the traditional definition of
'voluntariness.' ,'97 The Court was critical of the Ninth Circuit's requirement that consent must be affirmatively shown, since this arguably
would enable
[a]ny defendant who was the subject of a search authorized solely
by his consent [to] effectively frustrate the introduction into evi412 U.S. at 226-27. (citations and footnote omitted).
Id. at 227-34. These considerations include knowledge of the right to refuse, alternate means of obtaining evidence, and the presence or lack of coercion. Id. at 227-33.
194 Id. at 227.
195 Id. (footnote omitted).
196 Id. at 228.
197 Id. at 229.
192
193
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dence of the fruits of that search by simply failing to testify that
9 8s
he in fact knew he could refuse to consent.

Justice Stewart observed that federal and state courts alike have
'almost universally repudiated" the idea that the subject should be
advised of his right to refuse. Again, as with the affirmative showing
argument, Justice Stewart stressed the practical difficulties this would
pose for the government. "Consent searches are part of the standard
investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies."' 199 The need for
them may arise spontaneously, in virtually any setting, frequently as a
logical extension of investigatory questioning. These unstructured
circumstances are not only far different from a formal criminal proceeding, but "are still immeasurably far removed from 'custodial interrogation'"200 where Miranda warnings must be given. They fit

within the general on-the-scene questioning or investigation, which
201
Mirandaexplicitly exempted from the advice requirement.
The Court's previous consent search decisions, Justice Stewart
asserted, reflected a careful sifting of facts and circumstances of each
particular case. An examination of instances of this "sifting" process
developed in earlier decisions, led the Court to conclude that it was the
nature of the items sought 202 and the officer's assertion of a valid warrant 20 3 which constituted the determinative "circumstances" on which
the previous cases had turned. He then found that one need not
know of the right to refuse as a prerequisite to an offer of a valid
consent.

204

Finally, Justice Stewart found a clear distinction between the
waiver of fourth amendment rights accomplished by consent to search
198 Id. at 230.

199 Id. at 231-32.
200 Id. at 232.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 233. According to Justice Stewart, Justice Douglas in Davis looked to
"[t]he public character of the property, the fact that the demand was made during
business hours at the place of business where the coupons were required to be
kept . . . the fact that the initial refusal to turn the coupons over was soon followed by acquiescence in the demand .... "
Id. (quoting from Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946)). It must be remembered that the property seized in Davis consisted of coupons which had never become the
personal property of the defendant. See notes 35-50 supra and accompanying text.
203 412 U.S. at 234. To buttress this position he quoted Bumper, where the Court
held that
" [w]hen a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search.
The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where
there is coercion there cannot be consent."
Id. (quoting from Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968)).
204 412 U.S. at 234.
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and the kind of waiver that, under Johnson v. Zerbst,20 5 requires "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 20 6 The latter requirement has "been applied only to those rights
which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to
preserve a fair trial. ' 20 7 The Zerbst test, Justice Stewart suggested, has
most often been applied to a waiver of counsel or of the rights surrendered by a plea of guilty. Moreover, the Court has not permitted an
accused to give up his rights of confrontation, jury trial, speedy trial,
or freedom from double jeopardy without a knowing relinquishment.
This same concern for a fair trial has led to the conclusion that
counsel must be afforded at certain stages before trial such as post208
indictment lineup and in-custody interrogation.
Justice Stewart emphasized, however, that fourth amendment protections "are of a wholly different order, and have nothing whatever
to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal
trial." 209 He further reasoned that the fourth amendment was intended
to protect the values which have been placed on the right of an individual to be left alone. While it shelters the individual from arbitrary
police intrusion, a search is not rendered unfair by the fact that it
resulted from a person's consent to it:210

[T]here is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person's voluntarily
be preallowing a search. The actual conduct of the search may
21
cisely the same as if the police had obtained a warrant. '
Based on this premise, Justice Stewart deduced that the interests of
society are actually served by consent to a search, since the search may
yield evidence that leads to the solution of a crime thus protecting the
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
412 U.S. at 235 (quoting from 304 U.S. at 464 (1938)). The Court also noted that
in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), the consent was invalid because the entry
into Johnson's living room was "'granted in submission to authority rather than an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right.'" 412 U.S. at 243 n.31 (quoting
from 333 U.S. at 13). It then concluded that although
the Court spoke in terms of "waiver" it arrived at the conclusion that there had
been no "waiver" from an analysis of the totality of the objective circumstancesnot from the absence of any express indication of Johnson's knowledge of a right
to refuse or the lack of explicit warnings.
412 U.S. at 243-44 n.31.
207 412 U.S. at 237 (footnote omitted).
205

206

208
209

Id. at 237-40.
Id. at 242.

210 Id. (citing Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
211 412 U.S. at 243.
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innocent against mistaken charges.21 2 He concluded by stating that it
was virtually impossible to apply Zerbst waiver standards to consent
searches, and that to require advice about one's right to refuse in the .
detail demanded by Zerbst would be out of the question.21 8 Conversely,
if a less detailed "diluted waiver" were found sufficient, "that would
itself be ample recognition of the fact that there is no universal stand214
ard that must be applied."
Misleading Treatment
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, raised three objections to the
majority opinion. 211 He found that the Court's criteria for determining
when a verbal assent is a valid consent was inconsistent with other
cases and "not responsive to the unique nature of the consent-search
exception." Second, he felt that the Court had applied a voluntariness
standard that was "developed in a very different context" and which
was based on different policy considerations. Third, he was of the
opinion that the majority had mischaracterized "prior cases involving
216
consent searches."
With regard to his first criticism, Justice Marshall found the
majority's analysis of the cases dealing with warrant requirement exceptions to be inapplicable when a search is justified solely by consent.
Since the warrant requirement exceptions were based upon the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances, neither of
which apply in the "consent" situation, 217 Justice Marshall felt that
the majority's reasoning should not control:
Thus, consent searches are permitted, not because such an exception to the requirements of probable cause and warrant is essential
212 Id.

218 Id. at 24345.
214 Id. at 245. Justice Stewart added that
even a limited view of the demands of "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" standard would inevitably lead to a requirement of detailed warnings before any consent search-a requirement all but
universally rejected to date.
Id. n.33.
As authority for this assertion, Justice Stewart relied in part on Gorman which seems
to offer no real support for this conclusion since Gorman applied the Zerbst waiver standard without finding consent warnings necessary. Furthermore, the court in Gorman found
it significant that Miranda warnings had been given to the consenting parties prior to the
search request. See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
215 412 U.S. at 280. Justice Marshall characterized the majority view as "misleading
in its treatment of the issue." Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 282-83.
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to proper law enforcement, but because we permit our citizens to
choose whether or not they wish to exercise their constitutional
218
rights.
Justice Marshall further reasoned that the majority had missed
the case's central issue in failing to properly distinguish between coercion and consent. He found a crucial distinction between the fourth
amendment rights waived by consent, and the freedom from "compulsion" or "coercion" protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which cannot be waived. "[N]o sane person would knowingly
relinquish a right to be free of compulsion."2 19
.
Thus, a defendant's
knowledge of his right to be free from compulsion is irrelevant in a
confession case. Even information conveyed by advice concerning
rights required by Miranda "is intended only to protect the suspect
220
against acceding to the other coercive aspects of police interrogation."
Justice Marshall criticized the majority's interpretation which
found Davis and Zap to be supportive of a "totality of the circumstances" test. He concluded that Davis turned upon the nature of the
evidence seized, and not upon the theory of implied consent, and
reasoned that Zap had been decided on the notion of voluntary waiver
derived from the defendant's status as a party to a government contract
which had specifically provided "that his records would be open at
221
all time [sic] to the Government."
In rejecting the majority's approach to consent searches, Justice
Marshall offered an alternative view. He described his interpretation as
"straightforward and.. . obviously required by the notion of consent
222
as a relinquishment of Fourth Amendment rights."
If consent to search means that a person has chosen to forgo
his right to exclude the police from the place they seek to search,
it follows that his consent cannot be considered a meaningful
223
choice unless he knew that he could in fact exclude the police.
Examination of both the Court's previous consent decisions and
the pre-Miranda confession cases lends support to Justice Marshall's
criticism.
218 Id. at 283. Justice Marshall further observed that police convenience alone was
never deemed sufficient to establish an exception to the warrant requirement. "Yet the
Court . . . seems to say that convenience alone justifies consent searches." Id. at 282-83 n.9.
219
220

Id. at 281.
Id.

221 Id. at 279 nA.Justice Marshall found that no other case had explicitly upheld a
search on the basis of a defendant's consent. Id. n.5.
222
223

Id. at 284.
ld. at 284-85.
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(1) The majority's reliance on the pre-Mirandacriteria for determining the voluntariness of a confession and their obliteration of the
consent-coercion distinction considerably weakens the strength of the
Bustamonte opinion. Pre-Miranda decisions did not treat the issue
of voluntariness as having anything to do with a waiver of rights because they had evolved from the common law rule that involuntary
confessions were unreliable evidence which must be excluded from
2 2 was the
trial. 224 Brown v. Mississipp=
first case in which the Court
evaluated, under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, confessions that had been admitted in state prosecutions. 226 The initial

emphasis was on reliability, but the voluntariness test came to include
scrutiny of
practices which are repellent to civilized standards of decency or
which, under the circumstances, are thought to apply a degree of
pressure to an individual which unfairly impairs his capacity to
make a rationale choice. 227
These cases did not scrutinize confessions to see if the defendant
had waived his constitutional rights, since at that time, an. in-custody
defendant did not have any recognized right to demand that he not
be interrogated. 22 Furthermore, until 1964, a state defendant had no
federally protected privilege against self-incrimination. 229 These cases
were, in short, concerned with a "voluntariness" concept that was
distinct from the subject's waiver of federal constitutional rights.
Pre-Miranda standards for determining whether a confession had
been coerced had nothing in common with the Court's test for the
validity of a consent search. This is dramatically illustrated by contrasting the facts of Amos and Johnson with those of confession cases.
Some pre-Miranda confessions that had been reviewed by the Court
were extracted after prolonged and intensive police questioning, and
even then, some were found by the Court to be voluntary.2 0 In Amos
224 Miranda appears to be the first case to apply the privilege against self-incrimination to police interrogation. 384 U.S. 436, 506 n.2 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 384 U.S. at
526-30 (White, J., dissenting).
225
226

297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Id. at 279.

227 Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel:
Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 62, 73 (1966). For a
short analysis of this line of cases, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506-14 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
228 See note 224 supra.
229 This fifth amendment right was "incorporated" into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
230 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 238-40 (1941) (confession extracted after two
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and Johnson, on the other hand, simple once-stated police "demands"
were found to be invalid consents simply because they were made "under color of office." Justices willing to countenance intense pressure
by interrogating police would not permit even a firm showing of
authority to obtain a valid consent to search. 2 1
(2) Bustamonte's assertion that confession and consent cases
raise similar "competing concerns" was also fallacious. 23 2 An interrogation is typically a quest for an admission of guilt or an account of the
details from a suspect who is neither under formal arrest or at least is
in custody. Therefore, interrogation rarely occurs in the early stages
of investigation. Police are seeking testimonial evidence that cannot
usually be obtained without this type of questioning.
Justice Marshall observed that a search whose validity hinges on
consent is hardly the product of "overriding needs of law enforcement. '233 If the police have probable cause to search, in addition to an
overriding need to do so quickly, then they do not need consent to
proceed without a warrant. In situations such as this, one of the "exigent circumstances" exceptions to the warrant requirement will apply. 234 If the police do not have probable cause, then "the needs of
'23 5
law enforcement are significantly more attenuated.
The individual's interests are different in the consent situation, as
the Court willingly acknowledged when it came to the question of
whether a consent subject should have Miranda-type warnings. 236 The
subject of custodial interrogation is a suspect whose "right to be let
alone" has already been weakened or lost because of a finding of suffiprotracted incommunicado interrogations held voluntary where there was no evidence of
promises or coercion by police); cf. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 60-68 (1951) (confession held voluntary where accused was detained for a total of 25 days before arraignment).
231 Compare the position of Justice Jackson on confessions in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
332 U.S. 143, 159-63 (1944) (Jackson, Roberts & Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting) (while 36 hours
of interrogation are "inherently coercive," admissibility of a confession thus obtained still
requires an independent examination of the circumstances) with his position on consent
searches in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12-15 (1948) (smell of burning opium
emanating from hotel room held not sufficient to justify a search without a warrant even
with "consent" since demand was made under "color of office').
232 412 U.S. at 227.
233 Id. at 282-83.
234 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (search without a warrant held permissible because of "exigencies of the situation'); cf. United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct.
467 (1973) (search incident to an arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132, 153 (1925)
(high mobility of motor vehicles held sufficient to create "exigent circumstances').
235 412 U.S. at 283.
236 Id. at 246-48.
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cient probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime. 23 7 Not

until Miranda did the Court hold that a person in this position had a
right not to be interrogated. 28 And, when this right was announced,
the Court made it clear that in-custody suspects had to be put on
notice that they were being interrogated.2 9 Conversely, the person
whose consent is sought for a search has an absolute right to forbid
police intrusion. It follows that if there is any analogy between the
consent and confession situations, it certainly must be closer to the
post-Miranda requisites of police conduct than to those of the preMiranda era.
(3) The Court's formula for balancing the need for consent
searches against the individual's right to freedom from coercion 240
fails, as Justice Marshall's cogent distinction between coercion and
consent makes clear.241 Even beyond the fact that the individual's
fourth amendment rights, and not his freedom from coercion, are at
stake, the Court exaggerates both the prosecutorial interest in consent
searches and the burden the prosecution must bear under a requirement that it demonstrate that the subject knew of his right to refuse. 242
It may be true that Bustamonte's crime might never have been solved
had it not been for the consent search, but this touches upon the argument that the Court has eschewed as constitutionally impermissible
countless times before-that a search is justified by what it turns up.243
287 Usually, the subject of custodial interrogation has already been arrested and subjected to the search and inventory procedures that follow an arrest. Even the interrogation
of a person who is not under arrest does not become "custodial" until he has been deprived of his freedom in "any significant way" and/or is the focus of suspicion. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91
(1964).
28 384 US. at 444.
289 Id. at 444-45.
240 412 U.S. at 227-34.
241 Id. at 282-84. See pp. 245-46 supra.
242 Id. at 284-89. Justice Marshall reasoned:
I doubt that a simple statement by an officer of an individual's right to refuse consent would do much to alter the informality of the exchange, except to alert the
subject to a fact that he surely is entitled to know.
Id. at 287. It is significant to note that for years, federal law enforcement authorities have
been able to cope with the waiver concept first articulated in Amos v. United States, 255
U.S. 313 (1921). See also Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 826 (1966); Comment, Consent Searches: A ReappraisalAfter Miranda v. Arizona,
67 COLUM. L. Ray. 130, 143 (1967).
248 Justice Jackson, in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), vigorously stressed
that
a search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when
it starts and does not change character from its success.
Id. at 595 (footnote omitted). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959);
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In light of the fourth amendment, consent searches should be
viewed as an exception to the warrant requirement and not as a general
rule of police conduct. Although police may utilize consent searches
as an investigative aid, consent should not become a convenient tool
to circumvent the need for thorough preliminary investigation or to.
"short-circuit" the fourth amendment protections which otherwise
apply. Several decisions reveal that consent searches which have yielded
evidence have been frequently obtained by officers whose suspicions
either would have ripened into probable cause or would have faded
away upon further investigation.2 4 4 Other cases indicated that consents
are obtained by officers who already had probable cause and merely
245
sought a shortcut to avoid the warrant requirement.
(4) The Court, in predicting dire consequences should the Ninth
Circuit's requirement of "knowing waiver" prevail, drastically escalated
Justice Traynor's warning in the Michael case.2 46 Justice Traynor expressed concern that a suspect's voluntary revelation of all evidence
might be followed by a claim at trial or evidentiary hearing "that he
acted only in response to an implied assertion of unlawful authority. ' 247 He did not, however, express any fear as to the possibility that

a defendant's failure to testify that he had knowledge would preclude a
government showing of consent.
(5) The Court's refusal to require an affirmative showing that
the consenting person knew of his right to withhold permission to
search also involved a distinction between the interests involved in the
waiver of fourth amendment rights and a waiver of "fair trial"
rights.2

48

From this follows the Court's argument that neither the

Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927); Gibbons, PracticalProphylaxis and Appellate
Methodology: The Exclusionary Rule as a Case Study in the Decisional Process, 3 SETON
HALL L. REv. 295, 299-306 (1972).
244 See, e.g., Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 96-99 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 826 (1966).
245 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
246 412 U.S. at 229-31. The Court asserted that any defendant could effectively frustrate the use of seized evidence by merely stating that he did not know that he had the
right to refuse his consent to search. Id. at 230.
247 Id. at 230-31 (quoting from People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 754, 290 P.2d 852,
854 (1955)). Justice Traynor did not believe that a visit to a suspect's or witness' home for
the purpose of conducting an interview was improper. However, he did hypothesize that
a criminal could "defeat his prosecution by voluntarily revealing all of the evidence against
him" and then, at trial, contend that such information was elicited under an assertion of
authority. 45 Cal. 2d at 754, 290 P.2d at 854. Justice Traynor did not assert, as the Court
implies, that the criminal might suppress evidence by contending that he did not know
that he had the right to refuse to permit a consent search. 412 U.S. at 230.
248 For a discussion of the Court's distinction between waiver of "fair trial" and fourth
amendment rights see pp. 243-45 supra.
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detailed waiver inquiry suitable for a judicial hearing nor the detailed
warnings required in a custodial interrogation would be appropriate
for the usual consent request. 249 The observation, however, that the
fourth amendment does not protect the integrity of the fact-finding
process should not be dispositive of the issue. For one thing, the protections afforded the fourth amendment are fundamental. The Supreme Court applied the fourth amendment 250 and its exclusionary
rule251 to the states years before it found the rights to counsel, 252 si-

lence, 253 speedy trial, 254 or jury trial 255 sufficiently important to merit
the same status. In the Court's opinion, the fourth amendment and
its exclusionary rule have been found to be important enough to allow
the guilty to go free if law enforcement officers transgress their requirements, even where a good-faith effort to comply with these requirements has been made. 250 Why, then, should an alleged surrender
of fourth amendment protections at police request be treated more
lightly than a waiver of other rights?
Why Not Warnings?
Bustamonte appears disjointed and inconsistent with earlier case
law, if considered from a purely precedential perspective. If one, however, integrates the Court's legal analysis with its expressed concern for
the protection and expansion of law enforcement effectiveness, then
the Court's reasoning ostensibly satisfies its societal objectives. This
concern, particularly for law enforcement officials who must deal "with
the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets, ' 257
was also manifested in the Court's earlier sanctioning of protective
"stop and frisk" procedures 258 and specific exceptions to the warrant
412 U.s. at 246-47.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
251 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961).
252 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963). As early as Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), co-defendants facing a possible death sentence were held to have the
right to counsel because such an advocate was essential to insure procedural due process.
Id. at 68. The holding, however, was not based on the sixth amendment.
253 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,8 (1964).
254 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
255 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
256 See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416-20 (1969) (affidavit in support
of warrant held invalid because no allegation that informant was "reliable" and no allegation of fact supporting conclusions that suspect was running an illegal bookmaking operation); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-59 (1967) (evidence obtained through electronic surveillance held inadmissible, even though police acted reasonably, because wire249

250

tap authorization not properly obtained).
257 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).
258 See id. at 30-31.
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requirement that were necessitated by exigent circumstances. 2 9 It was
not until Bustamonte that the Court saw fit to accommodate law enforcement needs by abruptly discarding traditionally respected personal
liberties which had previously been jealously protected. It is submitted
that even under the particular facts of Bustamonte, such a departure
from the traditional waiver concept was not warranted. A consent
search, even when conducted only after adequate warnings are conveyed to the subject, would not substantially impinge upon police
effectiveness.
The complex inquiries that must be made of a defendant who
pleads guilty, 260 or an accused who insists on trying his own case, 28' may
be inappropriate in the informal setting of a consent search request.
Similarly, a definitive Miranda-type warning might be too cumbersome
to be practicable in a consent situation. These pragmatic considerations
should not be permitted to justify the conclusion that the subject of a
consent search can in ignorance waive the fundamental rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment. Moreover, there are several alternatives
available to the state to demonstrate the subject's knowledge of the right
to refuse consent. Such knowledge could be conclusively proved by
simply showing that the subject was apprised of the right to refuse to
give consent and that such refusal would be respected. 262 A warning of
this nature could hardly be expected to alter the informality of the
exchange between officer and subject, except as Justice Marshall observed "to alert the subject to a fact that he surely is entitled to
know."26a
See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1969).
261 See, e.g., Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150, 150-51 (1966).
262 412 U.S. at 286.
268 Id. at 287. The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure sets forth recommended warnings that should be given before a consent search request.
(2) Required Warning to Persons Not in Custody or Under Arrest. Before
undertaking a search under the provisions of this Article, an officer present shall
inform the individual whose consent is sought that he is under no obligation to
give such consent and that anything found may be taken and used in evidence.
(3) Required Warning to Persons in Custody or Under Arrest. If the individual whose consent is sought under. Subsection (1) is in custody or under arrest at
the time such consent is offered or invited, such consent shall not justify a search
and seizure under Section SS 240.1 unless in addition to the warning required by
Subsection (2), such individual has been informed that he has the right to consult
an attorney, either retained or appointed, or to communicate with relatives or
friends, before deciding whether to grant or withhold consent.
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROcEDuRE § SS 240.2, at 61 (Proposed Official Draft
No. 1, 1972).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
259
260
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WHO CAN

CONSENT?

The second major issue concerning consent searches involves the
determination of who can consent to a warrantless search. In.many of
the cases considered above the consent was not granted by the suspect,
but by a third party. These cases include consents by wives for husbands, parents or grandparents for children, and landlords for tenants.
Thus the issue of third party consent arises in many diverse situations.
The purpose of this segment of the article is to examine these situations
and to explore the underlying rationale used by courts to justify third
party consent.
Prior to the decision in Bustamonte, consent to a search was generally considered a waiver of fourth amendment rights. Since the gen26 4
eral rule prevented one from waiving another's constitutional rights,
the courts had developed various rationales to justify third party consent to warrantless searches. Although the Court in Bustamonte rejected the waiver theory in consent cases, 265 it is still necessary for the
courts to develop a consistent and acceptable method of deciding
whether or not the consent of a particular person is a reasonable justification for a warrantless search.
Three rationales which have been suggested to justify third party
consent are:
(1) Implied agency-the court will imply, under certain circumstances, an agency relationship which supports the consent.
(2) Status relationship-the relationship between the parties (e.g.,
husband and wife) gives one party the right to consent for the
other.
(3) Possession and control-a person whose rights of possession
and control over the premises or property that are equal or
superior to those of the suspect may consent to a search.
Drugs maintain the practice of informing the suspect of his right not to consent. Id.
at 195.
The Newark, New Jersey Police Department written consent form states:
I,
-,
having been informed of my constitutional right not to have a
search made of the premises, hereinafter mentioned, without a search warrant and
of my right to refuse to consent to such a search ....
Consent to Search form No. DPI: 1493, on file at the Seton Hall Law Review.
264 See United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970). Judge
Gibbons, dissenting in that case, stated:
Only an attorney realistically possesses implied authority to waive another's constitutional rights and in practical experience the legal niceties of the existence of
implied authority are too complex to be pragmatically determined by a policeman
in the field.
id. at 845.
265 See 412 U.S. at 241-45.
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The implied agency and status relationship theories have generally
been rejected, while the possession and control theory has won general
acceptance. 66
Many of the early consent cases, especially those dealing with consent by wives for husbands, used the agency rationale to either accept
or reject the validity of the search. Some cases have held that'a wife
was impliedly authorized by her husband to consent to a search, while
others have been decided to the contrary. 267 The agency theory, which
was not limited to the husband-wife situation, but included parentchild, partner-partner, landlord-tenant, etc., has now been generally
repudiated and has been specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in
several cases. 268 In Stoner v. California, the Court said:
Our decisions make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the
2 69
law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of "apparent authority."
Upon a superficial examination, some of the third party consent
cases would seem to support the validity of the status relationship theory. They discuss situations such as a wife consenting for a husband
266 For examples of cases in which courts have looked beyond the agency relationship
to the question of actual possession or control, see United States v. Wixom, 441 F.2d 623
(7th Cir. 1971) (occupant of household with right of control equal to that of owner can
give valid consent to search); Nelson v. People, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965) (consent is
valid whether given by sole or joint occupant); United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954) (consent may be given by business partner with
equal right of control); Nestor v. State, 243 Md. 438, 221 A.2d 364 (1966) (co-tenant's consent held valid even though other co-tenant was present and raised objection).
Cases concerning consent by spouses have also stressed the underlying possessory interests. See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 471 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973) (wife's right to use premises was valid ground for consent, regardless of agency);
White v. United States, 444 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1971) (woman purporting to be wife may
validly.consent on basis of joint occupancy and possession); United States v. Alloway, 397
F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1968) (wife's consent held valid to permit police to seize spouse's clothing); Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980 (1965)
(wife in control of jointly owned premises can give consent); United States v. Sergio, 21 F.
Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) (wife found to be sufficiently in control of house to give valid
consent); People v. Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958) (consent by wife to search
a jointly owned trailer held valid); Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964) (wife
as joint occupant can give consent which is binding on husband); State v. Hagan, 99 N.J.
Super. 249, 239 A.2d 262 (App. Div. 1968) (paramour living at searched premises had authority to consent).
267 Compare United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) with United
States v. Rykowski, 267 F. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920). See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078,
1091-96 (1953).
268 See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964). See also Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
269 376 U.S. at 488.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

1974]

and vice versa, a child consenting for a parent and vice versa, a partner consenting for a partner, and an employer consenting for an employee. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that almost without exception
these cases are actually based on the third party's superior or equal
right of possession and control over the searched premises. Thus a wife
can validly consent to the search of a house in which she lives with her
husband, not because she is married to him, but because her right to
possession and control of the premises is equal to his.2 7 0 In some in-

stances the status relationship may be used to bolster a somewhat tenuous possession and control situation. For instance, a parent may not
have actual possession, but his status as parent, coupled with an apparent right of control, may be enough to justify the consent. 271 But
possession and control is almost universally the crucial factor. 272 For
example, one court has held:
[T]he consenting person has the authority, acting in his own behalf
and not as agent for the nonconsenter, to permit a search of premises to which he has immediate right of possession and control .

. .

. Thus, where two or more persons have joint and equal

possession and control of the premises, the prevailing rule is that
any one of them may consent to a search; and the evidence thus
disclosed may be used against any of them. 273
The possession and control rule relies on the fact that the third party's
right of possession should not be limited by the equal possessory rights
274
of others.
270 In Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980
(1965), the court, after affirming a wife's right to consent to a search of jointly held premises, stated:
It is not a question of agency, for a wife should not be held to have authority to
waive her husband's constitutional rights. This is a question of the wife's own
rights to authorize entry into premises where she lives and of which she had
control.
332 F.2d at 896-97.
271 See Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 1048, 87 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App.
1970) (parent-child relationship coupled with apparent right of control of premises justified
right to consent). Arguably, the one area in which a status relationship still carries weight
is the parent-child relationship. See Note, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure,
1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 12, 27-28.
272 One commentator has observed:
The rule most commonly employed to uphold third party consents to search
is that one who has possession and control of premises or an object may consent
to its search and evidence uncovered by that search may be used against anyone.
Comment, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 797, 804 (1966)
(footnote omitted).
273 Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 270-71 (Del. 1967).
274 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970),
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The Supreme Court impliedly accepted this rule in Bumper 2v.
77
276
North Carolina,27 5 Frazier v. Cupp, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, "
and specifically accepted the rule in United States v. Matlock.278 The
Court never questioned the validity of the searches in these cases and
found no need to examine the underlying theory.2 7 9 Although they are
recent indications of an acceptance by the Court of the possession and
control doctrine, those cases were not the first to have dealt with this
unsettled area of the law.
Two early cases, Weeks v. United States280 and Amos v. United
States,28 1 only touched upon the third party consent issue without
closely examining its validity. In Weeks, the Court implicitly recognized that neither a boarder nor a neighbor could consent to the
search of another's house. 282 In Amos, the Court specifically reserved
the question of whether or not a wife could consent to a search (directed against her husband) of the family home, and, as already dis2 83
cussed, decided the cases on the voluntariness issue.
wherein the court referred to one justification for upholding the consent of a joint-possessor
as the "undesirability of permitting the exercise of the right of one to be limited by the
right of the other." Id. at 842.
Although the majority of courts that have faced this issue have upheld the rule
allowing consent by a party with an equal or superior right of possession or control, a
few lower courts have specifically rejected it. Compare note 347 infra with People v.
Flowers, 23 Mich. App, 523, 179 N.W.2d 56 (1970), wherein the court, relying on Stoner,
held that a parent, despite his right of possession of the premises, could not waive his
son's fourth amendment rights where the parent had "no personal or punishable involvement in the crime suspected or charged." Id. at 526-27, 179 N.W.2d at 58.
Other courts, while following the majority view, have severely limited its extent. See,
e.g., Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955), where the court refused to
hold that the "consent of the owner of the premises validates the search and seizure of.
the property of another found thereon" where the search entailed officers breaking into
the locked personal effects of another. Id. at 826. See also United States v. Poole, 307 F.
Supp. 1185 (E.D. La. 1969). That case held that an owner of premises could not waive the
rights of a defendant as to "effects" or "enclosed spaces" over which the defendant had
exclusive control. Id. at 1189-90.
275 391 U.S. 543, 548 n.ll (1968).
276 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
277 412 U.S. 218, 245-46 (1973).
278 42 U.S.L.W. 4252 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1974).
279 This lack of examination was acknowledged in Note, supra note 271, at 12, where
the author stated:
Limitations upon the consents of third parties must ultimately rest upon the
fourth amendment. But here, as in other areas, the Supreme Court has formulated
only vague and general guidelines. In fact, it has not spoken at all on many important consent problems.
280 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
281 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
282 232 US. at 386, 398.
283 255 U.S. at 317. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 449 & n.5 (1965).
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In Chapman v. United States,2 4 the Court held that a landlord
may not consent to a search of a lessee's premises, even in a situation
in which the officers smell a strong "odor of mash."' 8 5 The State argued
that the landlord's right to enter and view waste was sufficient to justify
the consent. 286 The Court rejected that approach outright, refusing to
accept the use of technical property concepts to justify invasion of a
constitutionally protected right. The Court also recognized that such a
28 7
technical argument was utilized merely as a subterfuge for a search,
concluding:
[T]o uphold such an entry, search and seizure "wtihout a warrant
would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave
[ten288
ants'] homes secure only in the discretion of [landlords].
The Court's opposition to this variety of third party consent was
further evidenced in Stoner v. California,28 9 where it unanimously refused to uphold the validity of a hotel room search where consent was
given by the hotel desk clerk. 29 Prior to the search, the police discovered a check book belonging to Stoner, a robbery suspect. The check
stubs indicated that two of the checks had been made out to the Mayfair Hotel. The police went to the hotel and asked the clerk whether
Stoner was registered. When he answered affirmatively, the police requested permission to enter the room. After an inquiry, the clerk consented to the search. 29 1 The Court said:
It is important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner's
constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the night
clerk's nor the hotel's. It was a right, therefore, which only the
petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or through

an agent. It is true that the night clerk clearly and unambiguously
consented to the search. But there is nothing in the record to indicate that the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the
night clerk had been authorized by the petitioner to permit the po292
lice to search the petitioner's room.
284 365 U.S. 610 (1961).

Id. at 611, 616-18,
Id. at 616.
287 Id. at 616-17.
288 Id. (quoting from Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Clark reached the opposite conclusion. He interpreted Chapman's act of distilling illicit whiskey as a breach of the lease's covenants. Justice Clark
reasoned that upon the breach, Chapman, by operation of statute, ceased to be a tenant
and the landlord acquired full right of possession. 365 U.S. at 621.
289 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
285
286

290
291
292

Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 489.
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Thus, the Supreme Court in Stoner articulated the rule that a
third party cannot waive another's constitutional right to be free from
a warrantless search. Neither Chapman nor Stoner explicitly ruled out
all third party consents, however, since there still remains a viable
argument that some third party consents do not constitute waivers of
other's individual rights.
In Bumper, the defendant's grandmother consented to a search, and,
although the Court held the consent to be involuntary and thus improper, it recognized that since the grandmother "owned both the
house [the place searched] and the rifle [the thing seized]" she controlled a sufficient interest in the property to support her consent to the
search. 293 While that case turned on the voluntariness of the consent,
it presupposed the validity of the third party consent. The Court, although expressly having refused to decide the issue of third party consent in Amos, implicitly accepted this concept in Bumper without
294
analysis or explanation.
During this period, many lower courts had accepted the doctrine
of possession and control not yet articulated in any Supreme Court decision. 295 Both Stoner and Bumper can be reconciled if one accepts the
premise that the Court in both cases was following the possession and
control doctrine. The grandmother in Bumper had a right of possession
and control superior to that of the defendant which justified her right
to consent, while the hotel clerk in Stoner had no right superior to that
of the guest.
Later Supreme Court cases prior to Matlock in which third party
consents have been upheld add little to our analysis. For example, in
Frazier v. Cupp,29N the consent issue was treated as a "contention
293 391 U.S. 543, 548 n.11 (1968). The defendant conceded that the third party (grandmother) had the right to give consent, which would be binding upon him, provided the
consent was voluntary; the Court impliedly accepted this position. Id.
294 In both Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 449 (1965), and Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921), the Court specifically reserved decision on the third party consent
issue. For example, the Court in Henry reasoned:
Thus, consistently with the policy of avoiding premature decision on the
merits of constitutional questions, we intimate no view whether the pertinent controlling federal standard governing the legality of a search or seizure . . .is the
- same as the Mississippi standard applied here, which holds that the wife's consent
cannot validate a search as against her husband.
379 U.S. at 449 n.6 (citation omitted).
295 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892, 896-97 (8th Cir. 1964), cert.. denied,
380 U.S. 980 (1965); Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1948); People v.
Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 746, 312 P.2d 665, 670 (1957).
296 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
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[which] can be dismissed rather quickly." 29 7 The Court found no third
party consent problem with the search of a duffel bag owned by Rawls,
the cousin of the suspect defendant, and used by both parties. The
Court held Rawls' consent valid, stating:
Since Rawls was a joint user of the bag, he clearly had authority
to consent to its search ....

Petitioner, in allowing Rawls to use

the bag and in leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that Rawls would allow someone else to look inside.298

At the time of the search, the defendant was not yet a target of the
search while Rawls was; Rawls, therefore, was consenting to a search
299
which apparently had focused upon him.

Coolidge v. New Hampshirea °° has also been used by the Supreme
Court as a basis for justifying -third party consents.30 l In that case a
wife handed over articles belonging to her husband at the request of
0
police officers.80 2 The Court did not treat the transaction as a search3

3

and therefore it was unnecessary to justify any waiver of constitutional
rights. Thus, although there may be some argument as to the validity
of the Coolidge opinion, it is quite clear that Coolidge should not be
04
used as support to justify third party consents.
In Bustamonte, the Court considered the issue of voluntariness in
detail, while only touching upon the third party consent issue.30 5 The
owner of the searched vehicle was not present at the time of the search.
The consent was obtained from his brother, who was merely a passenger in the car,30 6 thus creating a clear-cut third party consent situation.
The Court offered no justification for its decision to permit the owner's
brother to waive the rights of the owner and the other passengers. The
decision merely cites as authority Coolidge, Frazier,and Abel v. United
297 Id. at
298 Id.
299 Id.

740.

300 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
801 For example, Coolidge was relied upon by the Court in both Matlock and Bustamonte to uphold its view in support of third party consents. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4254; 412 U.S.
at 245.
802 403 U.S. at 446.
803 Id. at 489-90.
U.S.
Ill. -,
304 N.E.2d 81 (1973), cert. denied, 804 See People v. Nunn, (Apr. 1, 1974). But see Note, Evidence Gained From Search to Which Wife Consented Is
Admissible Against Husband, 79 HAtv. L. Rav. 1513, 1518 (1966).
805 412 U.S. 245-46.
806 Id. at 220.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:211

States,3 0 7 which offer no rationale for deciding the validity of third
party consents. 0 8
An analysis of Supreme Court decisions indicates an undeveloped
but existing acceptance of the doctrine of possession and control as
justification for third party consent. 09 This position was specifically
adopted in Matlock.
In Matlock a paramour consented to a search of the house which
she jointly occupied with both her parents and the defendant. She allegedly told the police that she shared a particular bedroom with the
defendant, and upon searching that bedroom, the police discovered
incriminating evidence which the defendant later sought to exclude at
the pretrial suppression hearing. 10 The diitrict court held that the government had to satisfy two tests before a third party consent could be
deemed valid:
[F]irst, that it reasonably appeared to the searching officers "just
prior to the search, that facts exist which will render the consenter's consent binding on the putative defendant," and second,
that "just prior to the search, facts do exist which render the consenter's consent binding on the putative defendant." 311
The court thereby advanced both a subjective and objective standard
for ascertaining the admissibility of the evidence discovered.
The central issue before the district court was whether the government could introduce the paramour's statements as evidence to satisfy
the bifurcated standard set forth above. That court held the paramour's
statements about her cohabitation of the bedroom with the defendant
to be hearsay. Although such hearsay was admissible to prove that the
officers reasonably believed that she could give permission to search, it
was inadmissible to prove that she had authority to consent. 312
Thus the main issue before the Court was whether the hearsay
evidence was legally sufficient to support the government's burden of
307 362 U.S. 217 (1960). Abel does not specifically justify third party consent. Rather,
it merely permits a hotel manager to consent to a search after the former occupant has
abandoned the premises. Id. at 241. See pp. 276-78 infra.
308 412 U.S. at 245.
300 See Note, supra note 271, at 13, where the author stated:
The Supreme Court decisions seem to give support to the rule which has long
been generally accepted; that is, one who does not have rights of possession and
control in the premises searched cannot validly consent.
310 42 U.S.L.W. at 4252-53.
311 Id. at 4253.

312

Id.
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sustaining the objective test.3 13 In reaching this issue the Court recognized the validity of third party consents to search and said:
[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by
proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent
was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to
search was obtained from a third party who possessed common
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or
3 14
effect sought to be inspected.
The Court explicitly affirmed the generally accepted view that one
with an equal or superior right over a premises may consent to a search.
The Court emphasized that reliance upon traditional property concepts to define the possession and control doctrine was misplaced.
Rather, authority for third party consent should rest on
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access
or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize
that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection
in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that
one of their number might permit the common area to be
15
searched.
Matlock afforded the Court another opportunity to examine the third
party consent issue and to explore the constitutional basis for its previous position of permitting such searches. The Court refrained, however, from a close scrutiny of the constitutional justification for tlhis
type of search and instead chose merely to perpetuate its uncritical acceptance of the third party consent search as enunciated in its prior
316
decisions.
POSSESSION AND CONTROL

Although, as we shall later illustrate, we deem the constitutional
implications of third party consent to be of paramount importance, it
is initially necessary to explore the development of the possession and
control doctrine which permeates the entire history of third party con313 Id. at 4252. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the hearsay evidence was
admissible at the suppression hearing. "[T]he same rules of evidence governing criminal
jury trials are not generally thought to govern hearings before a judge to determine evidentiary questions ....
" Id. at 4255.
314 Id. at 4254.
315 Id. at 4254 n.7.
316 The Court relied on Frazier,Bustamonte, and Coolidge to substantiate the validity
of third party consent. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4254. As already indicated, none of these prior decisions include a thorough constitutional analysis of this issue. See pp. 258-59 supra.
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sent case law. The tendency of lower courts is to divide the possession
and control cases into various status relationships (e.g., husband-wife,
landlord-tenant, host-guest). Although this classification technique is
somewhat inevitable, it unfortunately serves to perpetuate the concept
that acceptance or rejection of a search based on consent depends upon
status relationships rather than upon the possession and/or control of
the person authorizing the search.
While it is a generally accepted doctrine that a person who has a
superior or equal right of possession and control can consent to the
search of a premises, 317 this rule requires further examination to define
its 'limits. Courts have considered many factors in determining who has
superior or equal right of possession and control. These include: legal
title, 1a actual possession,3 1 9 de facto control 3

tary,322

20

and familial,3

21

mone-

23

and employment relationships.
While these considerations
become inextricably interwoven and confused, they are at least basically
objective and can be factually ascertained. The situation is further confused by two other factors which are basically subjective in nature, and
arise in a number of cases, i.e., the belief of the officer making the
search, and the attitude of the person giving the consent. The first deals
with whether the police officer receiving the consent could validly assume that the person giving the consent had the right or the authority
to do so; the second deals with the attitude of the person giving the
consent. The latter factor can be further subdivided as follows:
(1) Agreement to consent out of antagonistic motives toward the
person at whom the search is aimed, and
(2) consent by a person who has a limited right of possession and
control but who wishes to exonerate himself of any implication
of criminal conduct.
317 Note, Third-Party Consent to Search and Seizure-The Need for a New Evaluation, 41 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 82, 83 (1966). The author commented:
The majority of courts have been liberal in finding that consent by a third
party validates a search, thereby rendering evidence seized admissible over the
objection of a non-consenting defendant. These decisions have usually been based
upon the third party's right of control over the property where the evidence was
seized, or his actual control of the property with the implied or apparent authority
to consent to the search.
Id. (footnote omited) (emphasis in original).
318 E.g., Anderson v. United States, 399 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1968).
319 E.g., Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952).
320 E.g., State v. Hagan, 99 N.J. Super. 249, 239 A.2d 262 (App. Div. 1968).
321 See notes 266-74 supra and accompanying text.
322 E.g., State v. Blakely, 230 So. 2d 698 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
323 E.g., United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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As we examine the various fact situations in which third party consents
arise, these subjective and objective factors will be analyzed as they
have been used or misused by the courts.
Landlord-Tenant
As already noted, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the
right of either a landlord or hotel clerk to consent to a search of a
tenant's or guest's room.3 24 The landlord has no valid right of possession or control during the period of the tenancy, lease, or rental. Even
where the landlord has the right to enter his tenant's room for cleaning
and similar purposes, he still does not have the right to consent to a
search since his rights are limited to entry for those purposes only.8 25
But in United States v. Botsch,326 where the landlord was given a key
and asked by the lessee to conduct certain activities at the scene which,
unknown to the landlord, could have implicated him in criminal conduct, it was held that the landlord could consent to a search and waive
the defendant's constitutional rights in order to extricate himself from
any taint of criminal suspicion.3 27 That raises the question whether an
individual, who is the focus of an investigation, and who believes that
evidence which could exonerate him is present in another's residence,
could consent to the warrantless search of that residence. Obviously the
answer to that question is "no." Thus it can be argued that the court
ties together the landlord-tenant relationship with the desire of the
landlord to extricate himself from implications of illegal conduct in
order to justify the intrusion. Neither of these elements alone would
suffice, but the courts apparently find that the combination of these
factors validates the consent.
Justice Black, dissenting in Bumper, argued that the defendant's
grandmother had voluntarily consented to the intrusion since "she
actually wanted the officers to search her house-to prove to them that
she had nothing to hide. ' 328 This suggests that in analyzing the validity
of the consent it is necessary to psychoanalyze the motives of the person giving it; if one really intended to give the consent then it is valid,
in
and if not, it is invalid. Both Botsch and the dissenting opinion
324

See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. at 616-18; Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. at

490.
325 Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1965); State v. Warfield, 184 Wis.
56, 60, 198 N.W. 854, 856 (1924).
326 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966).
327 Id. at 54748.
328 391 U.S. at 556 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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Bumper have had the effect of injecting the motives of the person giv32
ing the consent into the discussion of its legitimacy.
3
30
In People v. Gorg, a 23-year-old law student was living rent-free
3 31
in the home of Mr. Stevens in exchange for doing the gardening.
Stevens, after discovering marijuana plants in the student's room, permitted the police to search the room.33 2 The court felt that Stevens believed he possessed at least joint control of the student's room which
would justify him in permitting the police to search. In turn, the police
had the right to assume that Stevens could consent to the search. 33 The
court did not decide whether the student was a tenant, servant, or
guest, and it additionally failed to answer the question of who had possession and control. Rather, it relied on the subjective beliefs of both
Stevens and the officers conducting the search as to Stevens' authority
to permit the search. 334 This case might better have been decided on
a guest theory rather than on the broad-reaching doctrine involving
knowledge or belief of the police, and thus much of the confusion in
the law of consent searches might have been avoided. 335 It may be safely

333

See id. at 557 & nn.6 & 7; Botsch, 364 F.2d at 547.
45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955).
45 Cal. 2d at 778, 291 P.2d at 470.
Id. at 779, 291 P.2d at 470-71.
Id. at 783, 291 P.2d at 473.

834

Id.

329
330
331
332

335 Aside from the landlord-tenant relationship, it is important to note other areas
in which reliance is placed upon the beliefs of the authorities who had solicited consent
from a party who apparently had authority to grant it. For an outstanding example of
the use of this concept, one might look to Judge Gibbons' dissenting opinion in United
States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970), where he appears to
adopt the rationale of Gorg and applies it to a husband-wife situation. In Mazurkiewicz,
a married couple had stored their personal belongings in a garage which had been rented
solely by the husband and to which he had the only key. Id. at 843-44. The majority held
that the wife had no right to consent to a search. Id. at 844. Judge Gibbons disagreed,
observing that
Mrs. Cabey, as wife of the defendant, was superficially someone who could reasonably be assumed to enjoy full access to household items acquired as an incident
of her marriage.
Id. at 846. According to Judge Gibbons, since Mrs. Cabey had the apparent right to possession, such right being a normal incident of the marital relationship, the police should
not have been required to determine who had the technical right of possession and control,
but could instead have relied upon the apparent circumstances. Id.
Both Judge Gibbons in Mazurkiewicz and the court in Gorg relied heavily upon the
belief of the police officer conducting the search. Since the possession and control doctrine
is basically a property-oriented approach, it may be inconsistent to rely upon a subjective
test to decide who has the right of possession and control. For a thorough analysis of Gorg
and of the development of the "California rule," see Note, supra note 271, at 32-34.
People v. Misquez, 152 Cal. App. 2d 471, 313 P.2d 206 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) also involved
the subjective beliefs of searching officials. The court allowed a babysitter's consent to justify
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stated, however, that in the absence of unique situations like those presented in Botsch or Gorg, it has uniformly been held that a landlord's
consent will not justify a search. 3 8
Host-Guest
Hosts, as distinguished from landlords, are generally permitted to
837
consent to the search of their premises even if guests are using them.
In United States v. White 88 the court held that a lessee of premises,
who gratuitously permitted another to use part of his apartment on
visits, could consent to a search of the premises, and articles found
therein could be admitted into evidence against the guest. 3 9 The court,
however, did recognize that an area specifically set aside for a guest
8 40
may attain a protected status.
a search and further examined the reasonableness of the apparent right of control as perceived by the police officer. The court indicated:
Mrs. Baker [the babysitter] could reasonably suppose that possession of the key
gave her some control over the premises and that she was authorized to permit
the officer to enter. It was also reasonable for the deputy to suppose that since
Mrs. Baker had the key she had the authority which she purported to have, and
it was not unreasonable for him to act accordingly. Since he acted in good faith
and with her permission in making the search, the evidence obtained thereby
was not to be excluded because he might have made a mistake as to the actual
extent of her authority.
Id. at 379-80, 313 P.2d at 211.
836 See, e.g., Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1931), where the court
stated:
The right of a landlord to inspect the leased premises does not include the
right to "permit" third persons, not shown to be his agents, to come and go over
the premises on business other than the owner's.
See also State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963) (landlord reserved no right of
re-entry); Fitzgerald v. State, 80 Okla. Crim. 43, 156 P.2d 628 (1945) (landlord consented
to police entry to common areas of premises); State v. Warfield, 184 Wis. 56, 198 N.W. 854
(1924) (landlady's right of entry restricted to cleaning defendant's room).
It is important to note that in Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965), the
court suggested that Stoner overruled Gorg. Id. at 21 n.6.
837 In Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965),
the court saw "nothing unreasonable" in the search by police of a shared bathroom upon
the consent of the host in control of the premises. Id. at 413. State v. Plantz, 180 S.E.2d
614 (W. Va. 1971), held that consent given by grandparents was valid as to a defendant
"staying temporarily at the home of the grandparents," and where no "particular part"
of the residence had been assigned to defendant. Id. at 624-25. See also United States ex
rel. Perry v. Russell, 315 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Pa. 1970); McGee v. State, 2 Tenn. Crim. 100,
451 S.W.2d 709 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842 (1970).
838 268 F. Supp. 998 (D.D.C. 1966).
889 Id. at 1000-01. See Calhoun v. United States, 172 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
337 US. 938 (1949), where the defendant, although permitted to use a particular room,
was found to have "had no authority over [the] room when he was not personally occupying it." 172 F.2d at 458.
840 268 F. Supp. at 1002. But see Weaver v. Lane, 382 F.2d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968).
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For example, where a third party consents to the search of areas
specifically set aside for the use of the defendant or to the search
341
of his personal effects, such consent has been held invalid.

This rationale was again applied in United States v. Poole, 42 where the
court would not allow a host's consent to search a closed overnight bag
left in a closet to be controlling against a guest.343 The court stated:
The rule which emerges is that a defendant may object to a
search consented to by another where the defendant has exclusive
control over a part of the premises searched or over an "effect" on
the premises which is itself capable of being (and is) "searched."
"Enclosed spaces" over which a non-consenting party has a right
344
to exclude others, whether rooms or effects, are protected.

This rule, limiting the right of a party to consent to the search of
areas specifically set aside for or under the specific control of other persons, is not confined to host-guest situations. Justice Black, dissenting
in Bumper, pointed out that a gun which had been excluded from evidence was "not found in petitioner's private room, nor in any part of
the house assigned to him, but in the kitchen behind the door," and

therefore he believed that it should have been admitted into evidence. 345 Thus, he impliedly recognized limitations on searches conducted in places under the defendant's exclusive possession or control
346
and without his voluntary consent.

342

268 F. Supp. at 1002 (emphasis in original).
307 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. La. 1969).

343

Id. at 1189-90.

341

344 Id. at 1189. The Poole court further observed:
It is privacy, not ownership, that is protected. But the Fourth Amendment protects
only "reasonable expectations" of privacy . . . and perhaps courts have made the
social judgment that when a person leaves possessions in premises over which he
had no control, or right to control, any expectation of privacy on his part is unreasonable. However if a room is set aside for a non-consenting party, and he does
have a right to exclude others, a third party's consent to a search of this room
would upset a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added by the court). See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
345 391 U.S. at 555, 556 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting).
346 This principle has also been applied in the context of the marital relationship.
In State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962), the court recognized the right of a
wife to allow entry of officers into jointly-possessed property. However, it refused to allow
the wife to consent to the search of personal items found in a cuff link case which was
located in a dresser drawer clearly belonging to the defendant and not to his wife. Id. at
631-32, 372 P.2d at 371-72.
State v. McCarthy, 20 Ohio App. 2d 275, 253 N.E.2d 789 (1969), also decided that a
wife could consent to the search of the family home, but the search should be restricted
to the common areas of the home and should not extend to personal effects owned by the
husband. Id. at 283-84, 253 N.E.2d at 795.
The theory' of exclusive possession and control has also been used in both the employment relationship and the parent-child context. In Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d
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Children
In the parent-child situation, parents have generally been held to
possess the authority to consent to the search of a child's room and
effects. 347 For example, in State v. Kinderman348 the court held that a
father could consent to the search of his 22-year-old son's room.A49 The

case involved an appeal from a robbery conviction in which a gun and
certain clothing identified with the robbery were admitted into evidence over the defendant's objection. Kinderman contended that the
evidence was unlawfully obtained from his bedroom because a father
may not waive a son's constitutional right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures.35 0 Although the court upheld the
search and seizure because of the reasonableness of the police activities
and the apparent authority of the defendant's father to authorize it,
the language of the court might be construed as sanctioning the search
because of (1) the father's possession and control of the property, 51 (2)
the familial relationship,35 2 and (3) the desire of the father to protect
35 3
his property from use in criminal activity.
823 (5th Cir. 1955), even the familial relationship of mother and daughter, combined with
the daughter's possession of the area involved, could not justify her consent to the search
of locked personal effects belonging to her mother. Id. at 826.
The employer-employee relationship in United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), together with the ownership of an area and a desk by the employer, did not

give the employer the authority to consent to the search of his employee's desk, which
was used exclusively by the employee.
347 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944
(1965); People v. Clark, 252 Cal. App. 2d 479, 60 Cal. Rptr. 569 (Ct. App. 1967); Tolbert
v. State, 224 Ga. 291, 161 S.E.2d 279 (1968); People v. Thomas, 120 Ill. App. 2d 219, 256
N.E.2d 870 (1969); State v. Schotl, 289 Minn. 175, 182 N.W.2d 878 (1971); State v. Williamson, 78 N.M. 751, 438 P.2d 161 (1968); Commonwealth v. Hardy, 423 Pa. 208, 223 A.2d 719
(1966); Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); State v. Vidor, 75 Wash.
2d 607, 452 P.2d 961 (1969).
348 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965).
849 Id. at 412, 136 N.W.2d at 582.
350 Id. at 405-08, 136 N.W.2d at 578-80.
351 For example, the court stated:
[I]t would appear that the validity of such searches and seizures rests upon the
right of control over the premises by the one who gives the consent.
Id. at 410, 136 N.W.2d at 581.
352 In this regard, the court observed:
We can agree that the father's "house" may also be that of the child, but if a
man's house is still his castle in which his rights are superior to the state, those
rights should also be superior to the rights of children who live in his house.
Id. at 409, 136 N.W.2d at 580.
353 This premise was recognized by the court when it stated:
But in this case the consent was given by the father who did not wish to have
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In People v. Flowers,354 however, the Court of Appeals of Michi-

gan refused to allow a father's consent to justify the search of his son's
room 55 This was true even though the child was only seventeen (he
had, however, been arraigned as an adult) and the father owned the
house.8 56 The trial court combined the parent's right of control of the
premises with his right of control over the youth in order to justify the
consent. 57 The court of appeals, however, rejected the argument in
light of Stoner. It asserted that the trial court failed to recognize the
separation between the constitutional rights of father and son and held
that the son's constitutional rights could not be waived by the father. 5 8
The Illinois supreme court, in People v. Nunn,35 9 adopted the
"expectation of privacy" doctrine and found that a mother did not have
the authority to consent to the search of her son's room. 60 The son
was 19 years old and lived in his mother's house. He intermittently
gave her small sums of money. He left home some ten days before the
search, locked his room, and told his mother not to let anyone in. 36'
The mother invited the police to make the search. 36 2 The supreme

court, affirming the court below, held the search to be invalid on the
ground that the mother had set the room aside for the defendant's exclusive use, subject only to her housekeeping activities and her care of
his personal effects.

363

These Michigan and Illinois decisions are representative of the
property on his premises which did not belong there, and who joined with law enforcement officers in determining if such a fact were true.
Id. at 409, 136 N.W.2d at 580.
It should be noted that Justice Otis, who dissented in Kinderman, pointed out that
the youth involved was not a juvenile and that the mere fact that a son lived with his
parents should not have resulted in a loss of constitutional rights. More specifically he
stated:
I find nothing in such parent-child relationship from which implied consent to a
search and seizure of the kind here involved may be inferred. With or without the
payment of rent, I submit the Constitution requires that defendant's privacy be
respected and that his clothing located in living quarters exclusively occupied by
him be insulated from intrusion without a warrant ....
Id. at 418, 136 N.W.2d at 585.
354 23 Mich. App. 523, 179 N.W.2d 56 (1970).
355 Id. at 526-27, 179 N.W.2d at 58.
356 Id. at 524-25, 179 N.W.2d at 57-58.
357 Id. at 526, 179 N.W.2d at 58.
358 Id. at 527, 179 N.W.2d at 58.
359 Ill. 2d -,
304 NYE.2d 81 (1973), cert. denied, U.S. (Apr. 1, 1974).
This decision reversed a long line of Illinois cases.
860 Id. at -,
304 N.E.2d at 87.
861 Id. at -,
304 N.E.2d at.83.
862
363

Id.
Id. at

-,

304 N.E.2d at 83, 86.
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minority view; most courts accept the Kinderman approach with varying
degrees of reliance upon the three rationales set forth above.3 "
Husband-Wife
The most common form of consent probably arises in the husbandwife relationship. The majority of recent decisions dealing with this
relationship have allowed either spouse to consent to the search of
jointly-held property. 36 5 Earlier cases, which primarily discussed the
right of the spouse to consent in terms of agency principles, were split
3 66
as to the validity of such consent.
The more recent decisions which rely specifically upon the possession and control theory have generally permitted spousal consents to
search.3 67 Some cases, however, still reject this concept.3 8 The Supreme

Court of Arizona, in State v. Pina,3 69 for example, held that a wife
could not consent to the search of the apartment which she shared with
her husband because "a third person cannot waive another's basic
constitutional rights against unlawful searches and seizures unless specifically authorized." 370 The majority of cases, however, view the consent to search as a personal right-which one holds in his or her own
3 71
behalf-and not as a waiver of another's rights.

The cases which permit consent by a spouse in possession of
jointly-held property frequently lack a concise definition of that term.
Instead, they rely upon the generally accepted assumption that a wife
is in joint possession with her husband without requiring an examination of deeds or leases to determine who in fact has legal title or right
of possession.3 72 However, in State v. Blakely, 373 the court held that
364 See Note, supra note 271, at 27-28 & nn.82, 84.
365 See, e.g., United States v. Alloway, 397 F.2d 105, 109-10 (6th Cir. 1968); Roberts v.

United States, 332 F.2d 892, 896-97 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980 (1965).
366 There would appear to be a conflict of opinion as to whether a wife has the implied authority to consent to the search and seizure of her husband's property while it is
located on premises owned by him. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078, 1091-96 (1953); 47 Am.
JuL.Searches and Seizures § 72 (1943).
367 See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 471 F.2Q 170 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973); White v. United States, 444 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1971).
368 See, e.g., State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963); People v. Gonzalez, 50
Misc. 2d 508, 270 N.Y.S.2d 727 (App. T. 1966).
369 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963).
370 Id. at 247, 383 P.2d at 169.
371 See p. 255 supra.
372 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839, 846 (3d Cir.
1970) (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 980 (1965); United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
373 230 So. 2d 698 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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where a husband and wife lived in an apartment together but the husband paid the bills, the wife had no right to consent to a search.3 7 4 The
court seemed to emphasize technical legal concepts of possession rather
than actual possession and control. This case lacked understanding of
the fairly typical husband-wife relationship in which the husband earns
the money and pays the rent, while the wife cares for the home and
family and is considered equally in possession and control of the premises. The majority of jurisdictions accept the rule of law set forth in
Dalton v. State,375 in which the court rejected the consent given by a
wife to search a car which was registered in her name but which was
actually used and controlled by her husband. The court recognized the
importance of actual possession rather than title in deciding who had
37 6
the right to consent to the search of the property.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Kelley v. State,377
interjected

another concept into the growing confusion surrounding third party
consents in the husband-wife context. In that case, the court refused
to decide whether a wife under normal conditions could consent to a
search, but it did decide that since the wife was angry at her husband
and knowingly acted against his best interests, her consent was invalid.37 8 The language in that case suggests reliance upon the traditional status relationship argument:
Her whole attitude was contrary to his interests, and it could not
be said that she was acting in any sense in the family interest with
any authority to waive rights
which might otherwise properly
3 79
arise out of the relationship.
Thus, the court concluded that such relationship is meaningless when
38 0
antagonism exists between the parties.
381
A number of states have rejected this estrangement doctrine,
including New Jersey in State v. Crevina.38 2 There, the court did not
374 Id.

at 700.
375 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952).
376 Id. at 632-33, 105 N.E.2d at 511-12.
377 184 Tenn. 143, 197 S.W.2d 545 (1946).
378 Id. at 146-47, 197 S.W.2d at 546.
379 Id. at 146, 197 S.W.2d at 546.
880 Id. at 146-47, 197 S.W.2d at 546. It should be noted that in this case the wife was
the instigator of the action and had summoned the police. Id. at 144, 197 S.W.2d at 545. It
would seem that Kelley rejects any argument that a wife's consent is based on her possession
and control of the premises..
381 E.g., In re Lessard, 62 Cal. 2d 497, 504, 399 P.2d 39, 43, 42 Cal. Rptr. 583, 587
(1965), where the court stated that an "allegation of an 'estrangement' between [husband
and wife] does not destroy the consent."
382 110 N.J. Super. 571, 266 A.2d 319 (L. Div. 1970), alf'd, 119 N.J. Super. 50, 289 A.2d
801 (App. Div. 1972).
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consider the motives of the consenting party to be important since the
right to consent came from the wife's personal right and not from any
waiver of another's rights. 38 3 The wife initiated the contact with the
police by reporting to them that her husband was a thief and was keeping stolen property in their apartment. She requested that they remove the stolen merchandise. Without a warrant, the police accompanied the wife to her home where she took them to the bedroom and
relinquished the stolen items.38 4 Although the wife argued that she had
called the police because of a feeling of guilt, it was later shown that
she really did it because of her animosity towards her husband. 8 5 The
court said:
[W]e are not here dealing with such a waiver of another's rights
or a consent in behalf of another, but rather with a written consent
given in the wife's own behalf as an occupant of the apartment.
In that consent the wife specifically requested the police to remove
her apartment, and accompanied
the alleged stolen articles from
386
them there for that purpose.
Thus, New Jersey joins the majority of states that have recognized the
fact that husband-wife consent cases are merely examples of the general
rule concerning jointly held property. Regardless of the marital or
agency relationship, a person who has an equal or superior right of
possession can consent to a search. Recognizing that spouses gain their
right to consent from factors other than the marital relationship, it
becomes apparent that the right of a paramour to consent also springs
from a possessory right over the premises.
Paramours
In United States v. Robinson, 8 7 a police officer suspected of murder spent two or three nights a week with a paramour at her apartment. He stored certain personal items in two boxes which were located in a closet there. The police, with the permission of the paramour, opened the boxes and discovered items which were later to be
used as evidence against the defendant.3 88 The court held that the evidence was admissible, stating that " 'where two persons have equal
rights to the use or occupation of premises, either may give [lawful]
383 110 N.J. Super. at 574, 266 A.2d at 321.
384 Id. at 572-73, 266 A.2d at 320.

385 Id. at 573, 266 A.2d at 320-21.
386 Id. at 574, 266 A.2d at 321.
387 479 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1973).
888 Id. at 501.

0
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consent to a search.' ",389 It then distinguished those cases in which
courts had refused to allow consent by another when the accused had
special rights over an object or thing in the room by finding that in the
instant case the closet searched was used by both the woman and the
man, and thus she could consent to the search.39 0 Furthermore, since
the cardboard boxes had been left behind when the defendant took
many other objects with him, the court determined that the defendant
could maintain no expectation of privacy. 391 There was, however, no
showing of a true intentional relinquishment of control which would
be necessary for an effective abandonment, or evidence that the defendant had no intention of returning. The court relied on the fact that
he had removed other boxes and left the seized boxes behind. It added:
If a spouse does not have complete expectation of privacy in his
own home in view of the possibility of his mate's consent, the
casual lover who drops in at his convenience can hardly expect
more when he turns his part-time home over to the full-time dominion of his paramour and then places his belongings in un392
locked, uncovered cardboard boxes in a closet frequented by her.
Part of the difficulty in dealing with Robinson was caused by the
somewhat unusual nature of the living arrangements. Other cases that
have dealt with the rights of mistresses have also presented difficulties.3 93 In the 1970's, with the changing life style of many members of
society, the possession and control doctrine will become even more
difficult to apply. Questions such as whether members of a commune
will be permitted to waive the rights of other members are certain to
arise.
BAILORS AND BAILEES

The difficulties experienced by courts in applying the possession
and control doctrine to jointly occupied premises are also evident in the
389 Id. at 302 (quoting from United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 74 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954)).
390 479 F.2d at 302.
391 Id. at 302-03.
392 Id. at 302.
893 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 447 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1971) (girlfriend who lived
with defendant had authority to consent to search because of equal rights to possession and
occupancy); United States v. Airdo, 380 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 913
(1967) (defendant living in adulterous circumstances had standing to challenge search, but
search held valid since paramour had voluntarily consented); State v. Hagan, 99 N.J. Super.
249, 239 A.2d 262 (App. Div. 1968) (boyfriend who lived with defendant had authority to
consent to search).
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automobile search situation in which the vehicle is in the possession
of someone other than the owner. Questions which arise include: (1)
Does the owner (who has title and the right to possession) have the
authority to consent to the search of the car while it is in another's
actual possession? (2) Does the person in possession of the car (who
does not hold legal title) have the authority to consent to a search? (3)
Do both the bailor and the bailee have authority to consent? The courts
are divided on these as well as other related issues.
In Anderson v. United States, 94 the court held that the owner
of an automobile who was not in possession could consent to the search
of the vehicle while it was in the possession of a bailee since the
owner's right of possession was superior to the bailee's. 3

95

The court

bluntly stated:
[W]hen two people have a property interest in the property to be
searched, the waiver of the personal Fourth Amendment rights of
one party may act as a binding waiver of the personal rights of the
other party. 396
In contrast, United States v. Eldridge397 dealt with the ability of
the bailee of an automobile to consent to a search. The court permitted such a search which resulted in discovery of evidence adverse
to the bailor.398 While clearly allowing the bailee to consent to a
search, 399 the court in Eldridge, by way of dictum, draws an analogy

to the landlord-tenant situation in reaching the determination that a
bailor could not do so. 40 0 This determination can be inferred from the

court's reference to Chapman v. United States, 40 1 a landlord-tenant
decision in which the Supreme Court held that a landlord could not
consent to a search of a tenant's apartment. 4 2 Although the owner had
the right to reclaim possession, he could not consent to a search until
he had in fact done so. 4° Under this rationale, the bailor of the automobile who was not in possession would have no authority to consent
to a search. An argument can be made, however, that the analogy to
the landlord-tenant situation is misplaced and that a comparison with
the host-guest situation is more appropriate. In most bailment situa394 399 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1968).
395

Id. at 756-57.

396

Id. at 756.

397 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
398 Id. at 464-65.
399

Id. at 466.

400 Id. at 465.

365 U.S. 610 (1961).
Id. at 616-18.
403 302 F.2d at 465.
401

402
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tions the person borrowing the automobile holds it with a lesser degree
of control than does a tenant renting an apartment. This is particularly
true in a situation where the bailment is made gratuitously. Using the
host-guest rationale, a bailor who allows a person to use his automobile
gratuitously would still have the authority to consent; the bailee, on
the other hand, should not have the right to consent since by analogy
a guest would not have that authority.
State decisions are also in conflict as to the question of whether a
bailee may consent to a search. The Ohio supreme court, in State v.
Bernius,40

4

specifically rejected Eldridge in holding that a bailee may

not consent to a search. 40 5 After discussing Stoner, the court concluded:
[D]ecisions of the Supreme Court of the United States require this
court to hold that where the owner of an automobile entrusts the
possession and control thereof to another, a search thereof with the
consent of the one so entrusted but without the express consent or
authorization of such owner is, as against such owner, prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States as an unreasonable search. 40n
40 7
The later Virginia supreme court case of Henry v. Commonwealth,
however, rejected the approach of Bernius and allowed the bailee of
an automobile to consent to a search which yielded evidence against
408
a passenger in the car.
The variety of factual situations which have been presented in
bailor-bailee consent search cases have prevented uniformity of legal
analysis. Upon closer examination, however, one may conclude that
reasonableness, in the fourth amendment sense, provides the common
thread.
In Anderson, the defendant borrowed an automobile after he had
robbed a bank. The police apprehended him in the borrowed car, at
which time he was interrogated and arrested, and the vehicle' was impounded. The police, although not securing a search warrant, did
obtain written consent to search from the vehicle's owner.409 The
court upheld the search and admitted into evidence both clothing
and an incriminating note which were found in the vehicle. 410 The
177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
See id. at 157-58, 203 N.E.2d at 243.
406 Id.
407 211 Va. 48, 175 S.E.2d 416 (1970).
408 Id. at 51, 175 S.E.2d at 418.
409 399 F.2d at 754.
410 Id. at 756-57.

404

405
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decision, although containing language normally associated with
waivers of constitutional rights, merely concludes:
[I]t seems clear that at the time consent was given for the search
the property right of the owner, Miss Martinez, who was either in
possession or entitled 4to1 possession, was superior to the property
right of the appellant. '
Although when broadly construed the decision appears to authorize
a bailor's consent to automobile searches, it may also be read as turning upon its own particular facts. Because of the defendant's arrest and
the subsequent impoundment of the car, the bailment relationship
could be considered terminated. Therefore, under the circumstances,
the owner could be deemed to have had a greater right to possession
and control than any other person.
The defendant in Eldridge had permitted his friend to use his
car. Upon a report, the police investigated the automobile, saw a rifle
through the window, and left to obtain a search warrant. When they
returned, the police, without showing the warrant, asked the bailee for
permission to search the car. Permission was voluntarily granted and,
during the officers' search, two firearms (including a rifle) were discovered in addition to a knife and two Coast Guard radios. The guns
were owned by thedefendant, but the radios were stolen. 41 2 The court
held that while the bailee was in rightful possession-he "could do in
respect to the automobile whatever was reasonable and not inconsistent with its entrustment to him." 4 13 When the bailor-owner handed
the key to the bailee, he reserved no exclusive right of privacy. Thus,
since access to the trunk is a normal incident to the use of an automobile, under all the circumstances, the bailee could reasonably consent to a search of the trunk. The court recognized that although the
bailee's right of possession may not have been as great as a tenant's,
41 4
it was sufficient to justify the search.

. In Bernius, the police searched the defendant's automobile
after
the driver, a bailee, had been stopped and taken into custody. Miss
Young, the bailee, had given the car keys to the police who broke open
a suitcase which they found in the trunk.415 The state argued that Miss
Young had consented to the search and that she possessed the implied
authority to do so. The court rejected this argument and found that

414

Id.
302 F.2d at 464.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 465-66.

415

177 Ohio St. at 156-57, 203 N.E.2d at 242-43.

411
412
413
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under all the circumstances Miss Young did not have the authority to
permit either entry into the trunk or a search of the suitcase. 4 16
In Henry, the police spotted the defendant, a robbery suspect,
417
while he was riding in the back seat of a Pontiac driven by Massey.
Massey said that his brother-in-law owned the car but " 'it was in his
[Massey's] possession.' ",418 Massey agreed to a search of the automobile
at which time the police found a pistol in the back seat. 419 Although

Massey, the bailee, consented to the search, the conflict in this case
was not between the bailor and bailee, but between the bailee and a
passenger. The bailee apparently had a greater right of possession than
did the passenger. "Massey had the right to possess the Pontiac belong420
ing to his brother-in-law, whereas Henry had no possessory right.
Therefore, Massey's consent to search the back seat of the car was
reasonable.
The reasonableness approach can also be seen in Bustamonte. The
Supreme Court in that case did not deal with the third party consent
issue, yet the case was factually similar to Henry in that (1) the owner
was not present; (2) the person consenting was related to the owner;
and (3) although the defendant was present, his consent was neither
solicited nor obtained. 421 Therefore, the same basic reasoning which
led the Henry court to believe that under all the circumstances the
search was reasonable could also be applicable here.
While in a strictly theoretical sense the bailor-bailee cases are
contradictory, from a reasonableness perspective they are harmonious.
Confusion only arises because of an initial attempt to force these cases
into a rigid possession and control analytical framework. An ad hoc approach, combined with the utilization of a "reasonableness under the
circumstances" test, yields a more acceptable and congruous resolution
of the issues.
ABANDONMENT

Another aspect of third party consent evolves from the concept
of abandonment. The Supreme Court decided in Abel v. United
States422 that, after a room has been vacated by a tenant, a hotel owner
may consent to its search. Specifically, the Court ruled:
416 See id. at 157-58, 203 N.E.2d at 243.
417 211 Va. at 49, 175 S.E.2d at 416-17.
418 Id., 175 S.E.2d at 417.
419 Id.
420 Id. at 51, 175 S.E.2d at 418.
421 412 U.S. at 220.
422 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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[A]t the time of the search petitioner had vacated the room. The
hotel then had the exclusive right to its possession, and the hotel
management freely gave its consent that the search be made ...
So far as the record shows, petitioner had abandoned these articles.
.. . There can be nothing unlawful in the Government's appro423
priation of such abandoned property.

The abandonment approach flows out of the possession and control
doctrine. When such possession and control reverts back to the original
possessor, that possessor can consent to a search. 424 Traditionally, this
approach had been based on strict property concepts. United States v.
Wilson,425 however, stands for the proposition that
[t]he proper test for abandonment is not whether all formal
property rights have been relinquished, but whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the articles
6
alleged to be abandoned. 42
The facts in Wilson reveal that the tenant-defendant was a number of
weeks behind in rent payments. Someone had told the landlord that
Wilson was not returning, and the door to his apartment had been left
open. Upon entry, the landlord noticed explosive devices and subsequently informed the police. The court held that the landlord had the
right to consent to an entry by the police officers. Although defendant
under state law had not been lawfully evicted and therefore retained
legal right of possession, the court refused to be bound by technical
property concepts. 427 It justified the consent by employing the reasonable "expectation of privacy" doctrine found in Katz v. United
States.428 The tenant could not reasonably expect that, after a two
week abandonment without paying rent, an investigation would not
be made.

429

Wilson demonstrates one court's rejection of formal property concepts to define the scope of third party consent and the adoption of
the more modern "expectation of privacy" approach. Ultimately, this
423 Id. at 241.
424 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801, 806 (W.D. Pa.
1963), wherein the court stated:
Relator was not living at the home of his parents at the time of the search;
he had terminated his temporary visit on . . . the day of the robbery; he then
had no possessory interest in the premises either as a guest or invitee.
425 472 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1972).
426 Id. at 902.

427 See id. at 902-03.
428 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz stands for the proposition that the fourth amendment
protects persons, not places. Id. at 351.
429 472 F.2d at 903.
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"expectation of privacy" doctrine must rely upon an individual court's
interpretation of reasonableness. As we have seen, the possession and
control doctrine has not been consistently and uniformly applied, and
it appears unlikely that the "expectation of privacy" doctrine will
provide a viable alternative.
UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

In the preceeding analysis, no attempt was made to set forth all
of the possible relationships or factual situations in which third party
consents arise, or to set forth all the related law. Rather, the intent was
to examine some of the theories which the courts have developed to
grapple with this convoluted issue. These cases are typical of the complexities involved, and illustrate the difficulty encountered by the
judiciary in its attempt to develop a logical, consistent policy toward
consent searches.
Some courts and commentators have either suggested or implied
that no third party consent search should be permitted. 430 That solution would certainly end the difficulty of applying the rule. However,
the mere difficulty surrounding the rule's application should not
result in its elimination if it serves a necessary function and does not
violate any constitutional protections.
Of principal concern are the constitutional implications of third
party consent. As already indicated, consent to search constitutes a
waiver of a person's constitutional rights, even accepting the position
set forth in Bustamonte that it is not a waiver in the traditional
sense. 43 1 Although such rights may normally be waived only by the
430 In his dissent in United States v. Stone, 471 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 931 (1973), Judge Swygert stated that
[o]nly where a true agency may be shown, in the strictest legal sense of that
term, may a third party consent to a waiver of another's rights under the Fourth
Amendment. . . . This is a corollary of the long settled rule that constitutional
rights may be waived by their holder and none other.
471 F.2d at 175 (citation omitted). Accord, State v. Matias, 51 Hawaii 62, 68, 451 P.2d 257,
260 (1969). See also People v. Gonzalez, 50 Misc. 2d 508, 270 N.Y.S.2d 727 (App. T. 1966);
Comment, The Effect of a Wife's Consent to a Search and Seizure of the Husband's Property, 69 DIcK. L. REv. 69, 80 (1964); Comment, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure,
33 U. Cni. L. Rav. 797, 812 (1966); Comment, The Use of Evidence Obtained During a
Search and Seizure Consented to by the Defendant's Spouse, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 653, 656;
Note, Third-Party Consent to Search and Seizure-The Need for a New Evaluation, 41 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 82, 90 (1966); Note, Effective Consent to Search and Seizures, 113 U. PA. L.
Rav. 260, 277 (1964). But see Note, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 1967 WASH.
U.L.Q. 12, 40-41.
431 See 412 U.S. at 235-46. See also pp. 243-45 supra.
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defendant, 432 it has often beerr held, without adequate discussion, that
a person with an equal or superior right of possession to the goods or
premises in question could consent to a search, regardless of the rights
possessed by the person against whom the search was directed. 43 3 This

possession and control theory has been strongly attacked as being based
on property concepts and therefore inconsistent with the modern
constitutional perspective of protecting the individual's right to privacy. 43 4 Two reasons have been advanced, however, to rationalize the

application of this waiver to persons not present at the situs of the
search: (1) the third party is waiving his own rights and not those
of the defendant; and (2) the person against whom the search is
directed has assumed the risk that the third person will waive his
constitutional rights.

435

In analyzing the first rationale, it must be recognized that the
fourth amendment confers a.personal right. If two people live in the
same house, each has the constitutional right to be free from a warrantless search. Each also has the "right" to waive that right. The question
presented is: can one person waive his own fourth amendment rights
when to do so means that he automatically waives the identical rights
of another? This can be viewed as a clash of rights between the consenting and non-consenting parties. The rights, however, are not of
equal magnitude. The clear constitutional right to be free from a warrantless search, when balanced against the "right" to waive the warrant
requirement, must prevail in every instance. At least two decisions have
indicated that when two joint tenants are involved and one consents
and the other refuses to consent, the refusal takes priority. 43 6 Therefore, a person against whom a search is directed should not lose his
432 See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972) (right to speedy trial); Miranda

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966) (right to remain silent); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S.
1, 7-8 (1966) (right to confrontation); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269
(1942) (right to trial by jury); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (right to counsel).
433 See pp. 254-55 supra and accompanying notes.
434 See United States v. Matlock, 42 U.S.L.W. 4252, 4254 n.7 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1974). See
generally Comment, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 33 U. Ci. L. REV. 797,
807-09 (1966) and cases cited therein.
435 United States v. Matlock, 42 U.S.L.W. 4252, 4254 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1974); Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969); Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010 (1966); State v. McCarthy, 20 Ohio App. 2d 275, 284, 253
N.E.2d 789, 795-96 (1969).
436 Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 65, 68-69, 378 P.2d 113, 116, 27 Cal. Rptr.
889, 892 (1963). See Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16, 20-21 (9th Cir. 1965). See also MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAICNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 240.3, Comment (Proposed Draft No. 1, 1972),

where the authors stated: "It seems clear that a consent once given by X may be withdrawn or limited by Y, who has equal or superior control over the premises."
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fourth amendment rights simply because he is not fortuitously present
at the time consent was requested. 437
The assumption of risk doctrine, which evolved from the Katz
decision, has also been used to justify third party consents. 438 The
Supreme Court, by emphasizing that the fourth amendment protects
"people, not places," minimized the impact that formal property concepts had upon the determination of whether fourth amendment rights
had been usurped. 439 Under Katz, the fourth amendment guarantees
each individual a reasonable expectation of privacy which transcends
mere property law concepts and extends to at least some public
places. 440 Logically, the Katz rationale would imply a rejection of the
possession and control theory and the adoption of an expectation of
privacy theory. The question can, therefore, be posed whether an
individual's expectation of privacy can be destroyed by another, simply
because the latter enjoys equal property rights in the place or thing
searched. One commentator has even argued that the expectation of
privacy as enunciated in Katz can be safeguarded only if the courts use
predictable property concepts such as possession and control to determine the validity of third party consent. 441 According to this view, the
theory of possession and control would not be inconsistent with the
expectation of privacy expressed in Katz; rather, it would provide a
method of intelligently applying that premise. A person who lives
437 See Note, Family Consent to an Unlawful Search, 28 WASH. & LrE L. REv. 207, 220
(1971), wherein the author concludes:
To argue that an individual, absent temporarily from his home, can without
his knowledge or consent, have his constitutional rights vicariously waived by a
member of his family is to subjugate an individual's personal constitutional rights
to the control of another. Likewise, to base such an argument on the third party's
right of possession and control of the premises is to deflect attention from the real
issue. The fourth amendment defines an individual's right and only the individual
should be allowed to waive it.
438 See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
439 389 U.S. at 351-53.
440 Id. at 350-53.
441 In his recent article, Professor Fernand [rex] Dutile argued:
In third-party consent cases, then, it is precisely the agency and property
points which the Court should bear in mind. These considerations present the
most predictable and ascertainable standards consistent with safeguarding justifiable expectations of privacy. Faced with a third-party consent allegation, the
Court should inquire as to whether the third party had sufficient authority to
allow the entry from the point of view of either the third-party's property interest
or his express or implied delegation of power from another with such power. Such
an approach would be possible whether the third-party consent situation concerns
landlord-tenant, innkeeper-guest, wife-husband, child-parent, teacher-student or
any other.
Dutile, Some Observationson the Supreme Court's Use of Property Concepts in Resolving
Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CAm. U.L. Rxv. 1, 16-17 (1971) (footnote omitted).
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with another, or in the same house of another, would have a valid
expectation of privacy except as against the person with whom he has
chosen to live. If one wishes to allow a warrantless search, a roommate
is deemed to have assumed the risk of such acquiescence.
Katz, which has been relied upon to criticize the possession and
control rationale, 442 was specifically limited in United States v.
White.443 In White, a person consented to have his conversation with
the defendant taped by officials, and the Court held that the evidence
obtained was admissible. i 44 Additionally, the Court found that the
assumption of risk doctrine survived Katz and therefore a person could
still lose his expectation of privacy by confiding in another.44" Thus, the
White reasoning could arguably support the contention that a person
who lives with another has no right to assume that the other person
will not turn over evidence or permit a search by the police. However,
White is questionable even if limited to its facts, and since a consent to
search would seem to be more intrusive on constitutional rights than
a consent to the taping of a conversation, White is inappropriate to
support such an extension of the assumption of risk rationale. In a
search situation, a person's loss of privacy is not limited to the statements openly made to others, but extends to information which the
individual has attempted to keep confidential. Justice Harlan, in his
dissenting opinion, predicted that White would have a deleterious
effect upon the public's confidence and sense of security in personal
relationships, which have traditionally been a characteristic of life
in a free society. 446 For these reasons, the assumption of risk doctrine
does not adequately protect constitutional rights, and should therefore be rejected.
The constitutional ramifications inherent in third party consent
cases have been virtually ignored by the courts. This judicial acquiescence will undoubtedly continue as long as such searches are deemed
to be a necessary and vital part of police investigation. Criminal detection obviously becomes easier if third parties can authorize a search
in the absence of the person against whom the search is directed, even
where that person would deny consent. It is submitted that this reason442 United States v. Stone, 471 F.2d 170, 174-78 (7th Cir. 1972) (Swygert, C.J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 411 US. 931 (1973); People v4 Smith, 19 Mich. App. 359, 172 N.W.2d 902, 910
(1969); Comment, Third-Party Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysis, 41 U. CHI. L.
REv. 121, 126-27 (1973); Note, supra note 437, at 219.
448 401 US. 745 (1971).
444 Id. at 746-47, 749.
445 Id. at 751-53.
446 Id. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ing was primarily responsible for the refusal by the Court to require
consent search warnings in Bustamonte.447 The circumstances under
which such searches occur, however, militate against the adoption of a
consent rule based upon police convenience. Furthermore, since the
existence of an emergency obviates the need for third party consent, it
is not necessary in emergency situations. 448 If there is probable cause

and no emergency, the police can get a warrant. If there is no probable
cause, it is doubtful whether the search should be permitted. The
police still have other investigative techniques that can be used to
obtain probable cause and thereafter a warrant. At the very least, the
police should be expected to wait until the person against whom they
wish to direct the search is available to give or withhold consent. The
rejection of third party consent would not affect cases such as Frazier,
where a search consented to by the person against whom it was directed
elicited evidence against another. 449 In such situations, the evidence
450
would generally be admissible under the "plain view" rule.
In Matlock, Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion reaffirmed the
need for a warrant as a strict prerequisite for a search in the absence
of a genuine emergency situation. He cautioned that a loose interpretation of the warrant requirement could result in the fourth amendment's becoming nothing but "empty phrases."' 451 It appears that

fourth amendment interests, absent exigent circumstances, would
best be served by assuring freedom from warrantless searches, unless
See 412 U.S. at 227.
In a true emergency, the fourth amendment will not be violated if a warrant is
not obtained prior to the search and/or seizure. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770-71 (1966); see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1948) (dictum). See
also Miles & Wefing, The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled
Relationship, 4 SEroN HALL L. REV.105, 107 (1972).
449 394 Us. at 740.
450 In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968), the Court stated:
It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who
has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure ....
Accord, Ker v. California, 374 U.S.-23, 42-43 (1963); Coates v. United States, 413 F.2d 371,
373 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 56, 243 A.2d 240, 252 (1968). See Murray
& Aitken, ConstitutionalLimitations on Automobile Searches, 3 LoYoLA U.L.A.L. REV. 95,
98 (1970). Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971), added the requirement of
inadvertence to the "plain view" doctrine.
451 42 U.S.L.W. at 4259. Justice Douglas observed:
[I]ndeed, the provisions of the Fouth Amendment carefully and explicitly restricting the circumstances in which warrants can issue and the breadth of searches
have become "empty phrases" . . .. This was not a case where a grave emergency,
such as the imminent loss of evidence or danger to human life, might excuse the
failure to secure a warrant.... It is inconceivable that a search conducted without
a warrant can give more authority than a search conducted with a warrant.
447
448
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there is a personal waiver by the individual against whom the search
is directed.452
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Matlock, relying primarily upon the
reasoning in Bustamonte and its rejection of the waiver approach to
consent, reaffirmed its prior underdeveloped case law which accepted
the validity of third party consent. The public policy upon which
Bustamonte was based was derived from the apparent necessity of
utilizing consent searches to meet the demands of effective and efficient
law enforcement. This demonstrates the Court's increasing emphasis
upon the public's right to be secure from unlawful criminal activity
and evidences a departure from a concern for the individual's freedom
from unreasonable police intrusion. The proliferation of violence and
the rise in crime rates mandate that law enforcement officials have the
obligation to use all legitimate investigative methods to combat crime,
but these methods must exist within permissible constitutional
boundaries. Constitutional guarantees are best preserved by recognizing that consent to search is a waiver of personal constitutional rights.
This waiver should only be exercised by the person against whom the
search is directed; and then, only when knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made.
452 It may be argued that this rule is overly restrictive in situations where the third
party is not merely acquiescing to the search, but has affirmatively requested the police to
conduct the search. In such situations, it may be more desirable to admit the evidence
seized. However, even in these cases, the informaton presented by the third party would
generally constitute sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant. But see Comment, ThirdParty Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysis, 41 U. CU. L, Rav. 121 (1973), where the
author suggests distinguishing between those cases in which the police initiate the search
and those cases in which private parties inaugurate the police contact by requesting the
police to make a search. The author would reject the validity of police initiated searches
but would condone searches carried out by the police at the request of a private party
when that party has a "countervailing interest" which would give rise to a right to consent.
Id. at 134-43.

